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SUMMARY TABLE 
 2009 2010(e)* 2011(f) 2012(f)
 
OUTPUT 
 
(Real Annual Growth %)     
Private Consumer Expenditure -7.0 -1 - ¾ - ½ 
Public Net Current Expenditure -4.4 -5 -3½ -3 
Investment -31.0 -24½ -6 3¼ 
Exports -4.1 8¾ 6 5 
Imports -9.7 4 3 ¾ 3¼ 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) -7.6 ¼ 1½ 2¼ 
Gross National Product (GNP) -10.7 -1¼ ¼ 1½ 
GNP per capita (constant prices) -11.4 -1½ ½ 1½ 
 
PRICES 
 
(Annual Growth %)     
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) -1.7 -1½ 1 1 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) -4.5 -1 2 1½ 
Wage Growth -0.8 -3 -1 0 
 
LABOUR MARKET     
Employment Levels (ILO basis (000s))        1,929       1,851       1,826       1,831 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (000s))         259        287         287         273 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 11.8 13½ 13½ 13 
 
PUBLIC FINANCE     
Exchequer Balance (€bn) -24.6 -18.7 -17.9 -15.8 
General Government Balance (€bn) -23.0 -50.2 -15.4 -12.8 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) -14.4 -31½ -9 ½ -7¾ 
            Excluding Bank Payments -11.9 -11½   
General Government Debt (% of GDP) 65.6 93½ 99 104½ 
 
EXTERNAL TRADE     
Balance of Payments Current Account (€bn) -4.9 -0.1 1.7 2.9 
Current Account (% of GNP) -3.7 -0 1¼ 2¼ 
 
EXCHANGE AND INTEREST RATES (end of year)     
US$/€ Exchange Rate 1.39 1.31 1.29 1.29 
STG£/€ Exchange Rate  0.89 0.85 0.84 0.84 
Main ECB Interest Rate  1.00 1.00 1.25 2.25 
     
 
*In the tables and text we present percentages (rates of change or percentage shares) of historical data 
to one decimal point. For our forecasts such percentages are presented as fractions rounded off to the 
nearest quarter. This is to emphasise the distinction between historical data and forecast numbers. The 
figures for 2010 are estimates based on data for the first three quarters of the year. 
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SUMMARY 
The forecasts in this Commentary see GDP growing by 1½ per cent in real terms in 2011 
and by 2¼ per cent in 2012. The corresponding figures for GNP are ¼ per cent in 2011 
and 1½ per cent in 2012. Following the pattern of 2010, the growth which is envisaged for 
2011 and 2012 is made up of a strong export performance together with further 
contractions in domestic demand.  
 
Exports are forecast to grow by 6 per cent in 2011 and by 5 per cent in 2012. By 
contrast, consumption is expected to fall by ¾ per cent in 2011 and by a further ½ per cent 
in 2012. On-going uncertainty with respect to job stability, wages and taxation are likely to 
act against any rebound in consumption spending over the forecast horizon. Government 
purchases of goods and services and public investment are expected to continue shrinking 
in both 2011 and 2012. We see the banking crisis as being a key factor in the continued 
depressed level of both consumption and investment through an absence of affordable 
credit. 
 
Our GDP and GNP growth forecasts are lower than the corresponding forecasts which 
underpinned Budget 2011. As a result, we see the ratio of general government debt to GDP 
reaching 104.5 per cent in 2012, as compared to 102 per cent which is the forecast figure in 
Budget 2011. As we discuss in the General Assessment, given the uncertainties surrounding all 
forecasts, we would not place too great an emphasis on the difference. Instead, we take it as 
being an on-going indicator of the challenges which are faced in restoring the public 
finances to a sustainable path. We expect the general government deficit to be 9.6 per cent 
of GDP in 2011 and 7.8 per cent in 2012. 
 
While our forecasts envisage positive growth in both GNP and GDP for the first time 
since 2007, the rates of growth are still slow. For 2011, we see the growth in GNP and 
GDP being accompanied by continued employment falls as output growth is achieved 
through productivity growth. Employment is expected to average 1.83 million in 2011, 
down 1¼ per cent on the 2010 number. We do expect employment growth in 2012 but at 
just 5,000, this is tiny relative to the labour force. The rate of unemployment is expected to 
average 13 ½ per cent in 2011 and 13 per cent in 2012. Net outward migration is forecast to 
be 100,000 over the two year period April 2010 to April 2012. The highest rate of net 
outflow in the 1980s occurred in 1989 when the rate reached 44,000. Hence, our forecast 
for an average annual net outflow of 50,000 is high in historic terms, albeit against a larger 
population base. 
 
We expect the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to average 2 per cent in 2011 and 1 ½ per 
cent in 2012. For Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), we expect 1 per cent in 
both 2011 and 2012. We expect wages to fall by 1 per cent in 2011 and for them to remain 
constant next year. 
 
As referred to above, in our General Assessment we discuss how our forecasts compare 
to those in Budget 2011. We also make a brief comment on Budget 2011 in which we 
express some disappointment that the tax measures were so heavily focused on income as 
opposed to the implementation of taxes or charges that might be expected to impact less on 
economic activity such as property taxes. We note the on-going concerns surrounding the 
debt crisis in the Euro Area and how this situation gives rise to uncertainty in the context of 
forecasting. 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2010 (Estimate) 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
    
 2009 2010 Change in 2010 
  Estimate €bn % 
 €bn €bn Value Volume Value Price Volume 
        
Private Consumer Expenditure 84.3 81.8 -2.5 -0.8 -3 -2 -1 
Public Net Current Expenditure 27.7 26.1 -1.6 -1.4 -5 ¾ - ¾ -5 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 24.7 18.0 -6.8 -6.1 -27 ¼ -3 ¾ -24 ½ 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 144.8 156.9 12.2 12.5 8 ½ - ¼ 8 ¾ 
Physical Changes in Stocks -2.3 -0.1 2.2 1.7    
        
Final Demand 279.3 282.8 3.5 5.0 1 ¼ - ½ 1 ¾ 
less: 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0    
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 120.4 124.6 4.2 4.9 3 ½ - ½ 4 
less:        
Statistical Discrepancy -0.7 -0.7 0.0 -0.1    
        
GDP at Market Prices 159.6 159.0 -0.7 0.2 - ½ - ½ ¼ 
less:        
Net Factor Payments (F) -28.4 -30.8 -2.4 -2.1 8 ½ 1 7 ½ 
        
GNP at Market Prices 131.2 128.1 -3.1 -1.8 -2 ¼ -1 -1 ¼ 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
    
 2009 2010 Change in 2010 
 Estimate 
 €bn €bn €bn % 
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 2.2 2.4 0.2 10 
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 72.7 67.9 -4.8 -6 ½ 
  Other: 53.9 59.3 5.4 10 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation 1.0 -0.2   
 Statistical Discrepancy -0.7 -0.7   
     
Net Domestic Product 129.1 128.6 -0.4 - ¼ 
less:     
Net Factor Payments -28.4 -30.8 -2.4 8 ½ 
     
National Income 100.7 97.8 -2.8 -2 ¾ 
Depreciation 14.8 15.0 0.2 1 ¼ 
     
GNP at Factor Cost 115.4 112.8 -2.6 -2 ¼ 
Taxes less Subsidies 15.8 15.3 -0.5 -3 
     
GNP at Market Prices 131.2 128.1 -3.1 -2 ¼ 
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account 
    
 2009 2010 Change in 2010 
  Estimate 
 €bn €bn €bn 
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 24.4 32.4 8.0 
Net Factor Payments (F) -28.4 -30.8 -2.4 
Net Transfers -0.9 -1.7 -0.8 
    
Balance on Current Account -4.9 -0.1 4.8 
as % of GNP -3.7 -0.1 3.6 
D: GNDI and Terms of Trade 
    
 2009 2010 2010 Volume 
Change 
 Estimate 
 €bn €bn €bn % 
Terms of Trade Loss or Gain  0.5   
GNP Adjusted for Terms of Trade 131.2 130.0 -1.3 -1     
GNDI* 130.3 128.2 -2.1 -1½ 
National Resources** 130.4 127.0 -3.4 -2½ 
• GNDI is GDP adjusted for terms of trade and net international transfers. 
** GNDI including capital transfers. 
 FORECAST NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2011 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product  
  
 2010 2011 Change in 2011 
 Estimate Forecast €bn % 
 €bn €bn Value Volume Value Price Volume 
        
Private Consumer Expenditure 81.8 81.6 -0.2 -0.6 - ¼ ½ - ¾ 
Public Net Current Expenditure 26.1 25.0 -1.2 -0.9 -4 ½ -1 -3 ½ 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 18.0 17.0 -1.0 -1.1 -5 ½ ½ -6 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 156.9 166.8 9.9 9.4 6 ¼ ¼ 6 
Physical Changes in Stocks -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1    
        
Final Demand 282.8 290.4 7.7 7.0 2 ¾ ¼ 2 ½ 
less:        
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 124.6 129.8 5.2 4.6 4 ¼ ½ 3 ¾ 
less:        
Statistical Discrepancy -0.7 -0.7 0.0 0.0    
        
GDP at Market Prices 159.0 161.4 2.4 2.4 1 ½ -0 1 ½ 
less:        
Net Factor Payments (F) -30.8 -33.7 -2.8 -2.2 9 ¼ 2 7 
        
GNP at Market Prices 128.1 127.7 -0.4 0.4 - ¼ - ¾ ¼ 
   
B:  Gross National Product by Origin  
    
 2010 2011 Change in 2011 
 Estimate Forecast 
 €bn €bn €bn % 
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 2.4 2.5 0.1 5 
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 67.9 66.1 -1.7 -2 ½
  Other: 59.3 62.6 3.3 5 ½
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.2 -0.2 0.0 0 
 Statistical Discrepancy -0.7 -0.7 0.0 0 
     
Net Domestic Product 128.6 130.3 1.7 1 ¼
less:     
Net Factor Payments -30.8 -33.7 -2.8 9 ¼
     
National Income 97.8 96.6 -1.2 -1 ¼
Depreciation 15.0 15.3 0.3 2 
     
GNP at Factor Cost 112.8 111.9 -0.9 - ¾ 
Taxes less Subsidies 15.3 15.8 0.5 3 
     
GNP at Market Prices 128.1 127.7 -0.4 - ¼ 
 
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account  
    
 2010 2011 Change in 2011 
 Estimate Forecast 
 €bn €bn €bn 
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 32.4 37.1 4.7 
Net Factor Payments (F) -30.8 -33.7 -2.8 
Net Transfers -1.7 -1.7 0.0 
    
Balance on Current Account -0.1 1.7 1.8 
as % of GNP -0.1 1.3 1.4 
    
D: GNDI and Terms of Trade 
    
 2010 2011 2011Volume 
Change 
 Estimate 
 €bn €bn €bn % 
Terms of Trade Loss or Gain  -0.4   
GNP Adjusted for Terms of Trade 128.1 128.1 0.0 0     
GNDI* 126.4 126.4 0.0 0     
National Resources** 126.5 126.5 0.0 0     
•GNDI is GDP adjusted for terms of trade and net international transfers. 
** GNDI including capital transfers. 
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FORECAST NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2012 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 2011 2012 Change in 2012 
 Forecast Forecast €bn % 
 €bn €bn Value Volume Value Price Volume 
        
Private Consumer Expenditure 81.6 82.2 0.6 -0.4 ¾ 1 ¼ - ½ 
Public Net Current Expenditure 25.0 23.8 -1.2 -0.7 -4 ½ -1 ¾ -3 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 17.0 17.6 0.6 0.6 3 ¾ ¼ 3 ¼ 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 166.8 176.1 9.3 8.3 5 ½ ½ 5 
Physical Changes in Stocks 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0    
        
Final Demand 290.4 299.9 9.5 8.1 3 ¼ ½ 2 ¾ 
less:        
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 129.8 135.3 5.5 4.4 4 ¼ ¾ 3 ¼ 
less:        
Statistical Discrepancy -0.7 -0.7 0.0 0.0    
        
GDP at Market Prices 161.4 165.3 4.0 3.7 2 ½ ¼ 2 ¼ 
less:        
Net Factor Payments (F) -33.7 -36.2 -2.5 -1.8 7 ½ 2 5 ¼ 
        
GNP at Market Prices 127.7 129.2 1.4 2.0 1 ¼ - ½ 1 ½ 
   
B:  Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 2011 2012 Change in 2012 
 Forecast Forecast   
 €bn €bn €bn % 
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 2.5 2.6 0.1 2 
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 66.1 66.3 0.1 ¼ 
  Other: 62.6 65.3 2.8 4 ½ 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.2 0.0 0.2 -100 
         Statistical .Discrepancy -0.7 -0.7 0.0 0 
     
Net Domestic Product 130.3 133.5 3.2 2 ½ 
less:     
Net Factor Payments -33.7 -36.2 -2.5 7 ½ 
     
National Income 96.6 97.3 0.6 ¾ 
Depreciation 15.3 15.6 0.4 2 ½ 
     
GNP at Factor Cost 111.9 112.9 1.0 1 
Taxes less Subsidies 15.8 16.2 0.4 2 ½ 
     
GNP at Market Prices 127.7 129.2 1.4 1 ¼ 
 
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account  
 
 2011 2012 Change in 2012 
 Estimate Forecast 
 €bn €bn €bn 
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 37.1 40.8 3.8 
Net Factor Payments (F) -33.7 -36.2 -2.5 
Net Transfers 
 -1.7 -1.7 0.0 
    
Balance on Current Account 1.7 2.9 1.3 
as % of GNP 1.3 2.3 1.0 
D: GNDI and Terms of Trade 
 
 2011 2012 2012 Volume Change 
  Estimate  
 €bn €bn €bn % 
Terms of Trade Loss or Gain  -0.5   
GNP Adjusted for Terms of Trade 127.7 129.2 1.5 1 ¼ 
GNDI* 126.0 127.5 1.5 1 ¼ 
National Resources** 126.1 127.6 1.5 1 ¼ 
• GNDI is GDP adjusted for terms of trade and net international transfers. 
** GNDI including capital transfers.
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THE INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Great uncertainty surrounds the outlook for the international economy, 
even as the economic recovery continues. The resilient performance in 
2010 of many of the world’s major economies meant that their forecasts 
for 2010 have been revised upwards since the Autumn Commentary. Driving 
this more positive outlook is a stronger than expected recovery in Britain, 
the Euro Area and Japan. The output of the combined OECD countries is 
now estimated to have increased by 2.8 per cent according to the OECD 
Economic Outlook,1 up marginally from 2.7 per cent in earlier forecasts. As 
mentioned in previous Commentaries, there is significant variation in 
international growth rates, although the division is no longer simply 
between developed and emerging economies. Consumption demand in the 
United States and China brought about export-led growth in Europe and 
the rest of Asia, leading to some convergence in global growth rates, even 
as the performance of the US economy as a whole faltered somewhat in 
mid 2010.Emerging economies continued to grow steadily throughout 
2010, leading to an increase in their share of global GDP.  
 
The outlook for OECD output growth in 2011 has been revised 
downward from 2.8 per cent to 2.3 per cent. The evidence for a protracted 
recovery in the USA, greater austerity in some European economies and 
the need for household deleveraging across the developed world are 
expected to depress economic activity throughout the year. With economic 
growth expected to remain robust in emerging economies, the pattern of 
the global recovery looks likely to become more unequal in 2011. In 2012, a 
return to more robust growth is expected in the USA and Europe, resulting 
in OECD output growth of 2.8 per cent. 
 
Following disappointing mid-year results, fears of a return to negative 
output growth in the USA increased. GDP growth slowed to 0.4 and 0.6 
per cent in the second and third quarters of 2010, respectively. However, 
these worries have abated in light of positive information regarding retail 
sales, discretionary consumer spending, manufacturing, productivity, and 
stock prices. Although a return to recession now looks unlikely, the 
recovery is predicted to be prolonged and arduous. Prospects for growth 
have been dampened by the need for American households to repair their 
balance sheets, with the savings rate estimated to have risen to 5.5 per cent 
in the third quarter of 2010. This process is likely to weigh on growth for 
some time, although it will eventually lead to a better balanced economy. 
Growth is also being frustrated by the problem of persistently high 
                                                          
1 International forecasts used in this Commentary are taken from the OECD Economic 
Outlook No. 88, November 2010. 
Main 
Developments 
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unemployment, which stands at 9.4 per cent as of November, and 
continued uncertainty in the housing market. On the upside, both fiscal 
and monetary policy makers have committed themselves to expansionary 
policies in the near-term, which should help support economic recovery. 
The US economy is estimated to have grown by 2.7 per cent in 2010, and is 
forecast to grow by 2.2 per cent in 2011. The outlook for 2012 is more 
upbeat, with GDP expected to rise by 3.1 per cent, assuming that no 
significant steps are taken to reduce the fiscal deficit. 
 
The UK economy is experiencing a trade-led recovery as greater 
demand both domestically and in markets in Europe, America and Asia has 
led to increased exports and investment in the economy in the latter half of 
2010. Growth is estimated to have been 1.8 per cent in 2010, and is 
forecast to be 1.7 per cent in 2011 and 2.0 per cent in 2012. In 2010, 
growth is expected to be mainly as a result of increased investment as 
companies seek to restock following the rundown of inventories that 
occurred during the recession. The growth profile is expected to change in 
2011 and 2012, with exports becoming the leading determinant of output 
growth. Domestic consumption, although robust throughout 2010, is 
expected to flag over the coming years due to the need for households to 
repair damaged balance sheets and weak projected disposable income, 
which will dampen the recovery in the short run. The government’s fiscal 
consolidation, as set out in the 2010 Spending Review, will also act as a drag 
on growth in the short run, with government expenditure projected to fall 
by 8.3 per cent in real terms by 2015. According to the Office for Budget 
Responsibility, this consolidation will reduce net public sector borrowing 
from 11 per cent in 2010 to 1.1 per cent of GDP by 2015-2016. In the 
short run, fiscal austerity is expected to knock off 0.5 per cent off the 
growth rate. Monetary policy is expected to remain accommodative in 2011 
at the cost of higher inflation. The increasing price level, coupled with a 
sustained recovery, is expected to lead to a tightening of monetary policy in 
2012. 
 
The fortunes of the economies that make up the Euro Area have been 
wildly divergent in recent times. Both Greece and Ireland were shut out of 
the sovereign debt markets and forced to seek assistance from the IMF and 
the EU in 2010. Question marks have also been raised over high debt levels 
in Portugal, Spain and Belgium. These developments contrast sharply with 
the stellar performance of the German economy and the more benign 
outlook for growth in France and Italy. Restocking and fixed investment 
spurred output growth in 2010, which is estimated to have increased to 1.7 
per cent. Growth acceleration is not expected in 2011 as the persistent 
tension in financial markets stunts economic recovery. Assuming the crisis 
abates in 2012, more robust growth is expected in that year. However, 
there is considerable tail risk present in the European financial system due 
to the interconnected nature of bank and government funding, and since 
no credible solution to the crisis has yet been agreed upon. The Euro Area 
is forecast to grow by 1.7 per cent in 2011 and by 2 per cent in 2012. 
Monetary policy is expected to remain loose in the short term, with the 
current low interest rate regime and accommodative credit facilities set to 
remain in place. 
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Many Central Banks around the world have sought to aid domestic 
recoveries through relaxed monetary policies. In the US, Britain and the 
Euro Area effective interest rates were reduced close to zero and 
exceptional liquidity measures were provided to encourage economic 
activity. Quantitative easing, whereby Central Banks create money in order 
to purchase government bonds and other financial assets, was also 
employed by the Bank of England and the US Federal Reserve in order to 
depress interest rates and encourage investment. In November, the US 
Federal Reserve, citing the elevated unemployment rate and subdued 
inflation expectations, announced a continuation of this process. The stated 
intent is to buy $600 billion in US Treasury bonds before June 2011 in an 
attempt to bring down long-term interest rates in order to stimulate 
spending in the economy and prevent deflation. This policy carries with it 
some risk, especially if inflation exceeds the Federal Reserve’s expectations. 
There is also a worry that an expansionary fiscal policy will dampen the 
effect of quantitative easing by creating more debt, thereby increasing long-
term yields. 
 
In an international context, the impact of the Federal Reserve’s policy 
will be to weaken the dollar on exchange markets, thus making American 
exports more competitive. The excess liquidity created will also have a 
knock on effect on commodity and emerging markets. The evidence of this 
is already becoming apparent. These effects, coupled with ongoing 
exchange rate controls in China, have induced a protectionist response 
from Central Banks around the world. Countries seeking to maintain their 
relative competitiveness have intervened in currency markets in order to 
depreciate their exchange rates, while emerging economies such as Brazil 
and Indonesia are seeking to prevent overheating caused by the inflow of 
foreign investment by limiting capital flows. Governments that managed to 
avoid implementing protectionist trade policies must now be wary of the 
destabilising effects of using monetary policy for the same purpose. 
Without international cooperation, the so-called currency wars could lead 
to dangerous imbalances developing in 2011. 
 
 
EXPORTS 
The performance of Irish exports remains strong as the recovery in the 
global economy continues, and this trend is set to continue on the basis of 
the growth forecasts for 2011 and 2012 discussed above. Crucially, future 
export potential depends on the fortunes of our main trading partners in 
America, Britain and the Euro Area. In the US consumer demand is 
expected to record weak growth due to the ongoing problems of high 
unemployment and high household debt, but early indicators for 2011 
suggest a brighter outlook than was envisaged in mid 2010. In Britain, 
consumption remained robust throughout the recession, but with 
government austerity measures set to increase in 2011, the prospects for 
significant growth in consumption over the forecast period is unlikely. In 
Europe, which accounted for nearly 43 per cent of total Irish exports in the 
first three quarters of 2010, demand has grown strongly as the core 
economies begin to restock, but recovery is being hampered by continuing 
difficulties in the financial markets. If considerable steps are taken in 2011 
Implications 
for Ireland 
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and 2012 to address these issues, the European market could experience a 
better balanced and more sustainable recovery. 
EXCHANGE RATES 
Due to the ongoing sovereign debt problems facing several Euro Area 
economies, the euro has weakened relative to other main currencies. The 
average dollar exchange rate for 2011 thus far has been $1.31, which is 
significantly below the three year average of $1.39. The euro exchange rate 
versus the yen shows a similar change, whereas the euro/pound exchange 
rate has remained far more stable. Dollar and sterling exchange rate 
movements in 2010 are shown in Figure 1 below. A weaker euro has 
helped boost Ireland’s export performance in markets outside the Euro 
Area. Indeed, as the euro has been in the maw of a sovereign debt and 
financial crisis, it is surprising that it has remained as strong as it has 
relative to other major currencies. It is a testament to the seriousness of the 
crisis that the euro has weakened against the dollar even as the Federal 
Reserve has committed itself to adding $600 billion in extra liquidity by 
June of this year. Normally, this would lead to the dollar becoming 
significantly more competitive against the euro, but instead we observe the 
opposite. 
Figure 1: Euro Exchange Rates 
 
  
 
Table 1: Short term International Outlook 
 
GDP Output Growth Consumer Prices* 
Inflation 
Unemployment Rate General Government 
Balance 
% % % % of GDP 
 
Country 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012
             
UK 1.8 1.7 2.0 3.1 2.6 1.6 7.9 7.8 7.6 -9.6 -8.1 -6.5 
Germany 3.5 2.5 2.2 1.0 1.2 1.4 6.9 6.3 6.2 -4.0 -2.9 -2.1 
France 1.6 1.6 2.0 1.6 1.1 1.1 9.3 9.1 8.8 -7.4 -6.1 -4.8 
Italy 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 8.6 8.5 8.3 -5.0 -3.9 -3.1 
             
Euro Area 1.7 1.7 2.0 1.5 1.3 1.2 9.9 9.6 9.2 -6.3 -4.6 -3.5 
USA 2.7 2.2 3.1 1.6 1.1 1.1 9.7 9.5 8.7 -10.5 -8.8 -6.8 
Japan 3.7 1.7 1.3 -0.9 -0.8 -0.5 5.1 4.9 4.5 -7.7 -7.5 -7.3 
China 10.5 8.5 9.0 5.9 -0.1 0.6 9.8 7.8 8.6    
             
OECD 2.8 2.3 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.3 8.1 7.5 -7.6 -6.1 -4.7 
             
Ireland 0.1 1 ½ 2 ¼ -1.6 1     1     13.4 13 ½ 13     -31.6 -9 ½ -7 ¾ 
             
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 88, November 2010. 
*HICP for EU countries, consumption deflator for rest of world. 
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INTEREST RATES 
Interest rates were cut to historically low levels during the course of 2009, 
and were maintained throughout 2010. Looking ahead to 2011 and 2012, 
there is likely to be some upward movement in interest rates as the 
European economy improves and attention turns to curbing inflation. 
Already in 2011, Euro Area inflation has surprised on the upside as oil and 
other commodities rise. These are inflationary pressures that were in place 
before 2008, and the global recession has provided only a momentary 
respite from the underlying trends that are driving these markets. Managing 
the twin goals of ensuring that the recovery is sustainable and yet avoiding 
the build-up of inflationary pressures will be a major task facing the ECB in 
2011 and 2012. 
 
The OECD is forecasting that inflation in the Euro Area is likely to 
remain below the target rate of 2 per cent in both 2011 and 2012, although 
these forecasts were arrived at before the recent rise in oil prices. Euro 
Areas Consumer Price Index is forecast to rise by 1.3 per cent in 2011 and 
by 1.2 per cent in 2012. These low forecasts indicate a large amount of 
excess capacity. As such, interest rates are forecast to remain low for much 
of 2011. We expect that the main refinancing rate will be kept unchanged 
in the first three quarters of the year, and will rise to 1.25 per cent in the 
fourth quarter. On the basis that the recovery is sustained in to 2012, we 
assume interest rates will to continue to increase throughout that year, 
rising to 2.25 by the fourth quarter. 
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THE DOMESTIC 
ECONOMY 
 The most recent Central Statistics Office estimates from the Quarterly 
National Accounts (QNA) for GDP and GNP suggest that the economy 
grew slightly in Q3. Cumulating estimated activity over the first three 
quarters of the year would suggest that the dramatic collapse in the 
economy over the course of 2008 and 2009 has finally come to an end. We 
estimate that volume GDP will broadly remain unchanged in 2010, while 
GNP could shrink up to 1¼ per cent. While the ending of the recession is 
a significant positive development, it is driven entirely by the contribution 
of net exports to overall growth. Exports have been growing strongly 
throughout 2010. However, the domestic economy, and in particular 
private consumption, has continued to contract. Our estimate for 2010 is 
that private consumption in volume terms will contract by 1 per cent, and 
is likely to continue to fall in 2011 and 2012. This is due to, inter alia, a 
significant deterioration in consumer confidence in the second half of 
2010, the likely impact of the 2011 budgetary package on disposable 
income and the anticipated further job losses, particularly concentrated in 
the financial and public sector. 
 
Using the QNA Q3 figures, we have calculated the implied carryover 
growth rate for 2010, as shown in Table 2. This is the growth rate that 
would occur if economic activity were to remain unchanged from the level 
recorded in the third quarter of 2010. Based on pure carryover, the latest 
QNA estimates suggest GDP would shrink marginally in 2010 by ½ per 
cent. Our estimate for 2010 GDP growth is very close to this, -¼ per cent. 
We expect the domestic economy to continue to shrink, counterbalanced 
by external demand, with exports performing strongly.  
Table 2: Implied Carryover from Quarterly National Accounts Q3, 
Constant Price Growth Rates 
CSO 
Estimate 
 
Carryover 
Based on 
First Three 
Quarters 
QEC 
Estimate 
2009 2010 2010 
CONSTANT PRICES 
Consumption  -7.0 -1.0 -1.0 
Government Expenditure -4.4 -4.9 -5.0 
Investment -31.0 -27.4 -24.5 
Exports -4.1 9.9 8.7 
Imports -9.7 6.6 4.0 
GDP at Market Prices -7.6 -0.5 0.1 
Net Factor Income 11.3 9.5 8.3 
GNP at Market Prices -10.7 -2.8 -1.3 
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Domestic consumption decreased by 0.5 per cent in the third quarter of 
2010 according to the latest figures from the Quarterly National Accounts 
(QNA Q3 2010). Consumption was 1.3 per cent lower than Q3 2009, 
compared to a yearly decline of 1.1 per cent in Q2. The continuing 
weakness of domestic consumption is shown in Figure 2. Although the 
decline in consumption is not as dramatic as was seen earlier in the crisis, 
its ongoing contraction will weigh on future investment, employment and 
inflation prospects. 
Figure 2: Quarter-on-Quarter Percentage Change in Volume of 
Consumption, Seasonally Adjusted 
 
Table 3 presents recent trends in a range of indicators of consumption. 
The reduced pace of the annualised fall in retail sales is driven largely by the 
ongoing recovery of the motor industry, which is buoyed by the 
government’s scrappage scheme. The retail sales index was down by 1 per 
cent in value terms in November compared to November of last year, but 
the index excluding motor sales was down by 2 per cent.  
Table 3:  Recent Indicators of Consumption (Annualised Volume Growth   
Rates) 
Retail Sales (Unadjusted) Trips Abroad 
 
New 
Vehicle 
Sales 
All 
Vehicle 
Sales 
All 
Businesses 
Excluding
Motor Trade 
Annualised Growth Rates 
% % % %       % 
2008Q3 -3.0 0.6 6.2 -12.8 -18.0 
2008Q4 -6.4 -2.5 2.1 -15.4 -20.9 
2009Q1 -11.4 -5.1 -3.1 -31.9 -44.7 
2009Q2 -13.1 -6.6 -5.0 -37.3 -53.3 
2009Q3 -14.1 -6.9 -9.6 -46.1 -62.2 
2009Q4 -14.0 -6.8 -10.5 -47.1 -62.5 
2010Q1 -8.6 -5.7 -9.2 -32.1 -38.8 
2010Q2 -4.2 -3.8 -10.4 -18.0 -8.1 
2010Q3 -1.2 -2.9 -6.8 1.4 29.7 
Consumption 
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Consumer confidence has been badly shaken by the continued ill-health 
of the economy that necessitated intervention from the IMF and the EU, 
as well as a particularly difficult budget and an upward revision of the cost 
of the domestic banking crisis. The KBC/ESRI Consumer Sentiment Index 
has fallen from a height of 67.9 in June to 44.4 in December. The decline in 
confidence since mid 2010 can be seen in Figure 3 below. 
Figure 3: KBC/ESRI Consumer Sentiment Index 
 
 
In 2010 we estimate that consumption fell by 1 per cent, which is a 
downward revision of our previous estimate of a ½ per cent drop, as a 
result of the worsening situation observed in Q3. In light of the greater 
fiscal austerity measures introduced in the budget, we have also revised 
downward our expectations for consumption growth in 2011. We now 
predict that consumption growth will fall by ¾ in 2011, which will in turn 
have implications for investment and employment prospects. Owing to the 
continued programme of fiscal austerity and poor employment prospects, 
the forecast for 2012 is for a contraction of ½ per cent. 
 
 After surprising on the upside in Q2, investment contracted significantly 
in Q3, according to the latest data from the Quarterly National Accounts. 
Investment in transport equipment (principally aircraft) was the main driver 
behind this decline, falling by nearly €1 billion, with investment in other 
machinery and equipment down nearly €300 million. This decline is 
unsurprising given the anaemic outlook for domestic consumption. 
Comparing Q3 2010 with Q3 2009, investment is down 30.9 per cent with 
significant reductions recorded in housing (dwellings and improvements), 
other building and construction, transfer costs, and machinery and 
equipment. Investment now represents just 14 per cent of GNP, compared 
to an average of 26 per cent in 2008. Figure 4 shows the deterioration in 
investment as proportion of GNP over the past two years.
Investment 
  
 
Table 4: Gross Fixed Capital Formation   
        
2009 % Change in 2010 2010 % Change in 2011 2011 % Change in 2012 2012
  
€bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn
           
Housing 7.4 -36 ¼ -37 ¼ 4.6 -15     -15 ¼ 3.9 5 ½ 6 ¾ 4.2 
           
Other Building 8.6 -25     -32 ½ 5.8 -10     -12 ¾ 5.1 0     -3     4.9 
           
Transfer Costs 0.6 -40     -60     0.2 -5     -10     0.2 0     0     0.2 
           
Building and   
Construction 16.6 -30 ¾ -35 ½ 10.7 -12     -13 ¾ 9.2 2 ¼ 1 ¼ 9.3 
           
Machinery and 
Equipment 8.1 -10     -10 ½ 7.3 5     6 ¾ 7.8 5     6 ¾ 8.3 
           
Total 24.7 -24 ½ -27 ¼ 18.0 -6     -5 ½ 17.0 3 ¼ 3 ¾ 17.6 
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Figure 4: Investment as a Share of GNP (Seasonally Adjusted) 
 
Looking at the housing market, the contraction continued in 2010, as 
shown in Figure 5. On an annualised basis, planning permissions for 
houses and apartments stood at 20,493 in 2010 Q3, 58.5 per cent lower 
than in 2009 Q3. Completions are down 47.5 per cent and registrations are 
down 50 per cent on the same basis. We estimate that house completions 
reached 14,500 by the end of 2010, which is an increase on our previous 
estimate. Activity is expected to remain weak in 2011 and 2012, with 10,000 
completions forecast for each of those years. 
Figure 5: Housing Statistics, Annualised Numbers 
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According to the permanent tsb/ESRI House Price Index, the pace of 
decline has continued to ease in the third quarter of 2010, falling by just 1.3 
per cent compared to the second quarter and 14.8 per cent lower than in 
the third quarter of 2009. The House Price Index has thus far fallen by 36 
per cent from its peak in early 2007, with the fall being most acute in 
Dublin where the index is down 45 per cent. We expect this trend to 
continue in to 2011, but to then bottom out in 2012. The peak to trough 
fall is expected to be in the region of 50 per cent, with prices remaining 
essentially flat thereafter. 
 
Investment as a whole is expected to have contracted by 24½ per cent 
in 2010, which is in line with our earlier forecasts. Investment in building 
and construction is estimated to have decreased by 30¾ per cent, whereas 
investment in machinery and equipment fell by 10 per cent. Investment will 
fall by a further 6 per cent in 2011, with the moderated pace of decline 
coming from an expected increase of 5 per cent in investment in machinery 
and equipment. Building and construction is expected to be a drag on 
growth in 2011 and 2012, but continuing investment in machinery and 
equipment is expected to lead to an increase in total investment of 3¼ per 
cent in 2012. 
 
 The Exchequer Returns for December 2010 confirmed the pattern on tax 
revenues which has emerged since the middle of 2010, namely that tax 
revenues have finally stabilised. In Figure 6 we can see the very rapid 
growth in the gap between tax revenues and voted expenditures between 
2007 and 2009. From a position of surplus in 2007, the gap widened to 
over €14billion within a two year period and at the end of 2010 stood at 
€14.6 billion. This measure of the deficit, which excludes the effects of all 
once-off payments to banks, debt interest payments  or transfers to the 
National Pension Reserve Fund, and also excludes all once-off revenue 
windfalls, is a useful yardstick for gauging the success of budgetary policy 
in relation to the fiscal crisis. On the basis of this metric, the measures 
adopted over the past number of years have been sufficient to stabilise the 
deficit. 
Figure 6: Exchequer Returns, Year Ended September 
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Table 5: Public Finances  
        
 2009  
€bn 
% 
Change 
2010
€bn 
% 
Change 
2011
€bn 
% 
Change 
    2012
€bn 
        
Current Revenue 33.9 1 ¾ 34.4 6 ½ 36.7 3.0 37.8 
   of which: Tax Revenue 33.0 -4     31.8 9 ¼ 34.7 5.7 36.7 
Current Expenditure 45.2 4     47.0 3     48.4 -2.3 47.3 
   of which: Voted 40.3  ¾ 40.5 3     41.7 -4.9 39.7 
        
Current Surplus -11.4  -12.6  -11.7 -18.7 -9.5 
        
Capital Receipts 1.5 22 ¾ 1.8 19     2.1 -23.6 1.6 
Capital Expenditure 14.7 -46     8.0 4     8.3 -4.0 7.9 
   of which: Voted 6.9 -14 ¼ 5.9 -27     4.3 -7.9 4.0 
        
Capital Borrowing -13.3  -6.2  -6.1 2.8 -6.3 
        
Exchequer Balance -24.6  -18.7  -17.9  -15.9 
 as % of GNP -18.8  -14 ¾  -14      -12 ¼ 
        
General Government 
Balance -23.0  -50.2  -15.4  -12.8 
 as % of GDP -14.4  -31 ½  -9 ½  -7 ¾ 
        
Gross Debt as % of GDP 65.6  93 ½  99      104 ½ 
        
Net Debt as % of GDP* 38.2  68 ¾  88 ¼  94     
        
*Net of liquid assets in NPRF and Exchequer Balances. 
 
However, as discussed in the previous Commentary, the stabilisation of 
this deficit has been overtaken by the costs of the bank bailout. With an 
estimated €31.4 billion additional funds included in the 2010 General 
Government Deficit, this has led to the measured headline deficit as a 
percentage of GDP of 31¾ per cent of GDP.2 This has in turn led to a 
significant jump in the Irish government debt burden, with gross 
government debt estimated at 93½ per cent of GDP3. Excluding these 
bank bailout monies, the underlying deficit is 11½ per cent of GDP. 
 
The Budget Book 2011 lays out in some detail the budgetary adjustments 
to be implemented in the years 2011 to 2014. We have implemented 
illustrative packages based on this information for 2011 and 2012 as 
follows. The total package for 2011 includes a total adjustment of €6 
billion, which is composed of a €1.4 billion increase in direct taxation (of 
which €1 billion on income tax), €1.8 billion reduction in capital spending, 
€2 billion reduction in current expenditure (of which €1 billion savings on 
transfer payments) and €660 million on once-off revenues. The total 
package for 2012 includes an adjustment of €3.6 billion which is composed 
of €1.5 billion on income taxes, €400 million reduction in capital 
                                                          
2 This figure is higher than in the previous Commentary which assumed a once-off bank 
bailout cost of €30.7 billion, the most recent data from the Budget Book suggest this 
number is closer to €31.4 bn. 
3 This is marginally lower than the official estimate in the Budget Book because this 
Commentary has a higher estimate for the value of GDP in 2010. 
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expenditure, €1.7 billion reduction in current expenditure (of which €700 
million is on transfer payments).   
 
Over the two year period, these adjustments add an ex ante €3 billion to 
the burden of direct taxation with a direct negative effect on personal 
disposable income. This is reflected in the negative growth in personal 
consumption in 2011 and 2012. Together with direct cuts to current and 
capital expenditure, which mean we forecast volume declines in 
government consumption in both years and a significant scaling back in 
public sector investment, this means that domestic demand will continue to 
contract in 2011 and 2012.  
 
Our estimates suggest that this package would be sufficient to bring the 
General Government Deficit to well below 10 per cent of GDP, at 9½per 
cent. In general for 2011 our forecasts are close to those of the Budget Book. 
However in 2012 our forecasts for growth and employment are lower than 
the official forecasts. This in turn means that our forecast for total taxation 
is €1.5 billion lower than the official forecasts. This is mainly driven by 
lower forecasts of income taxation driven by our lower employment 
forecasts. Offsetting this, we have a lower estimate of the debt interest bill 
in 2012, the official estimate is €6.9 billion, and we estimate that this could 
be €6 billion. 4 
 
In relation to the forecast of gross and net debt shown in Table 5, we 
have assumed that Exchequer cash balances are run down in 2011 and 
2012 so that by the end of 2012 net debt is forecast to be in the order of 
€155 billion or 94 per cent of GDP.5  More than €50 billion of this debt is 
related to funding the banking system (excluding NAMA). 
 
 The Quarterly National Accounts for Q3 2010 indicate that, having fallen in 
2008 and 2009, there has been a vigorous recovery in exports in 2010. 
Based on carryover alone, the QNA data suggest that exports could have 
grown in volume terms by up to 10 per cent in 2010. Figure 7 shows the 
quarterly data on volume exports and imports from the QNA. Since the 
end of 2007 quarterly volume exports fell steadily until the end of 2009. 
Since the beginning of 2010 there has been a strong recovery in exports, 
with the total value of exports in 2010 Q3 reaching a record high at 103 per 
cent of GDP.  
 
 
 
                                                          
4 In calculating our debt interest bill for 2011 and 2012, we include the cost of refinancing 
rollover debt and net off the implied run down of exchequer cash balances and the NPRF 
as indicated in Table 6 of the Budget Book (p. D19). We assume an interest rate of 6 per 
cent on new borrowings and net of €1.5 billion from the final figure, reflecting the 
decision to introduce an interest holiday on promissory notes for 2011 and 2012.  
5 The net debt is calculated by deducting liquid assets from the gross debt figures. These 
include Exchequer cash balances and the National Pension Reserve Fund. However we 
have excluded €17.5, an estimate of the directed investments into the Irish banking system 
of the NPRF by the end of 2011. From this calculation from 2011 onwards. Hence the 
discreet increase in the net debt figure in 2011. 
Exports 
  
 
Table 6: Exports of Goods and Services   
        
2009 % Change in 20010 2010 % Change in 2011 2011 % Change in 2012 2012 
€bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn
           
Merchandise 77 7 ½ 7 ½ 83 6     6 ½ 88 5     5 ½ 93 
Tourism 4 - ½ -1     3 5 ¾ 8     4 6 ¾ 9     4 
Other Services 63 10 ½ 10     69 6     6     74 5     5 ½ 78 
           
Exports of Goods  
  and Services 144 8 ¾ 8 ½ 156 6     6 ¼ 166 5     5 ½ 175 
           
FISIM Adjustment 1   1   1   1 
           
Adjusted Exports 145 8 ¾ 8 ½ 157 6     6 ¼ 167 5     5 ½ 176 
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Figure7: Quarterly Volume Exports and Imports, Constant Prices, 
Seasonally Adjusted 
 
 
The strong pick up in exports in 2010 has been largely concentrated in 
exports of services, in particular computer services and business services. 
In value terms, growth in non-tourism services averaged 8.8 per cent in the 
year ended 2010 Q3, while growth in merchandise exports was just 2 per 
cent. In volume terms merchandise exports grew slightly faster at 2.7 per 
cent, reflecting the fall in the export price deflator. This matches the fall in 
the wholesale price index for manufacturing of 0.5 per cent in the year 
ended 2010 Q3. 
 
Since 2000 the total value of merchandise exports has not changed 
considerably. Continued price declines have meant that the volume of 
merchandise trade has continued to rise. However, the mainstay of growth 
in exports since 2000 has been in the services sector. Services exports in 
2010 are estimated to account for over 46 per cent of total exports, up 
from 21 per cent in 2000.  
 
As discussed in the International section above, we expect the gradual 
upturn in the world economy to continue to support the demand for Irish 
exports over the forecast horizon. We estimate export growth of 6 per cent 
in 2011 and 5 per cent in 2012. While this is significantly slower than the 
8.7 per cent estimated growth rate for 2010, it does underpin the positive 
growth forecast in 2011 and 2012. With strong growth in the industrial 
sector and in particular in the pharmaceuticals sector, we expect 
merchandise exports to grow in volume terms by 6 per cent in 2011 and 5 
per cent in 2012. Tourism exports, which have fallen dramatically since 
2007 (by over 30 per cent), are expected to pick up in 2011 and 2012. Non-
tourism exports are expected to grow by 6 per cent in 2011 and 5 per cent 
in 2012. In relation to the terms of trade, we expect export prices to 
continue to lag the growth in import prices, with consequent terms of trade 
losses over the next two years. 
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 The Quarterly National Accounts for Q3 2010 indicate that volume imports 
fell by over 15 per cent between 2007Q4 and 2009 Q4 (see Figure 7 
above).  In particular merchandise imports fell dramatically over that period  
as shown in Figure 8. During the course of 2010, the collapse in 
merchandise imports has ceased and we estimate growth of 3 per cent in 
volume merchandise imports.  
Figure 8: Merchandise Trade Index, Seasonally Adjusted (Base 1990=100) 
 
 
By contrast, services imports have been growing strongly according to 
the latest data available for 2010, at a rate of 4.6 per cent in the year ended 
September 2010. This was largely due to growth in imports of business 
services and royalties. During this period tourism imports fell by 7.8 per 
cent, while transport imports fell by 4.1 per cent. 
 
On the basis of these trends and our forecasts for continued falls in 
consumption and investment in 2011 and 2012, we expect the volume of 
merchandise imports to grow by 1 ½ per cent in 2011 and 2012. With 
regard to services imports, we expect non-tourism services imports to 
increase by 3 ¾ per cent in volume in 2011 and by 3¼ per cent in 2012.  
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Table 7: Imports of Goods and Services    
  
 2009 % Change in 20010 2010 % Change in 2011 2011 % Change in 2012 2012 
 
€bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn €bn Volume Value
 
Merchandise 45 2 ½ 2     46 1 ½ 3 ½ 47 1 ½ 3 ½ 49 
Tourism 6 -2 ½ -3     6 -1     0     6 0     1     6 
Other Services 69 5 ¾ 5     72 5 ½ 5     76 4 ¾ 5     80 
           
Imports of Goods  
  and Services 120 4     3 ½ 124 3 ¾ 4 ¼ 129 3 ¼ 4 ¼ 135 
           
FISIM Adjustment 1   1   1   1 
           
Adjusted Imports 120 4     3 ½ 125 3 ¾ 4 ¼ 130 3 ¼ 4 ¼ 135 
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 Our forecasts for merchandise exports and imports imply an expansion 
of the merchandise trade surplus in 2011and 2012. The merchandise 
surplus is expected to increase by €7 billion between 2010 and 2012. The 
services trade deficit is estimated to have narrowed significantly in 2010 as 
a result of strong growth in services exports. In 2011 and 2012, we expect 
the services trade deficit to stabilise at around -€4 billion.. On the basis of 
our projections, in particular the expected increase in the merchandise trade 
surplus, we expect a significant expansion in the overall trade balance to 
over 30 per cent of GNP by 2012. 
 
Regarding net factor flows, the latest Balance of Payments data indicate a 
steady increase in net investment income outflows since the beginning of 
2009. We expect the net factor income deficit to increase by 9¼ per cent in 
2010 and by a further 7½ per cent in 2010. However, overall the expansion 
in the merchandise trade surplus should contribute to a rapid narrowing of 
the current account deficit which we expect to be broadly in balance in 
2010 before moving into a surplus of 2¼ per cent of GNP by 2012.  
Figure 9: Annualised Net Factor Flows, Balance of Payments  
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Table 8: Balance of Payments*  
   
 2009 Change 2010 Change 2011 Change 2012
 €bn % €bn % €bn % €bn
   
Merchandise Trade  Balance 32.4  37.3  41.0  44.2 
Service Trade Balance -8.4  -5.4  -4.6  -4.0 
 
Trade Balance in Goods and 
Services on BoP basis 24.0  31.9  36.5  40.2 
% of GNP 18.3  24 ¾  28 ½  31 ¼ 
 Total Debit Flows 82.4 -3 ¾ 79.2  ½ 79.7 2     81.2 
 Total Credit Flows 54.5 -10     49.0 -5     46.6 -2     45.6 
Net Factor Flows  -27.9 8 ½ -30.3 9 ¼ -33.1 7 ½ -35.6 
Net Current Transfers  -0.9  -1.7  -1.7  -1.7 
 
Balance on Current Account -4.9  -0.1  1.7  2.9 
        
Capital Transfers -1.3  0.1  0.1  0.1 
Effective Current Balance  -6.1  0.0  1.8  3.0 
% of GNP -4.7  -0      1 ½  2 ¼ 
        
*This table includes adjustments to Balance of Payments basis. 
 
 Table 9 includes a range of indicators of economic performance for 
recent years and for the forecast period. The first line shows the familiar 
GNP value, which we forecast will increase by ¼ per cent in 2011 and 1½ 
per cent in 2012. In terms of income per head, were this forecast to prove 
correct, this would mean that income per head at the end of 2012 would be 
at levels last seen in 2002. 
 
Finally, the last line in the table can be viewed as an indicator of 
competitiveness. While it is not the case that there is some target level for 
labour’s share of output, the increase in the value of the variable into 2009 
points to declining competitiveness. If our forecasts are correct, there will 
be a significant improvement in competitiveness and this is reflected in the 
fall in labour’s share out to 2012. 
Table 9: Performance Indicators 
 
Performance Indicators 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
GNP, in constant prices 6.0 6.5 4.5 -3.5 -10.7 -1 ¼  ¼ 1 ½ 
GNP adj for Terms of Trade 5.2 5.5 3.1 -5.9 -9.8 -1     0     1 ¼ 
GNDI, constant prices 5.1 4.9 2.8 -6.0 -9.7 -1 ½ 0     1 ¼ 
GNP per capita (constant prices) 3.7 4.0 1.9 -5.3 -11.4 1 ½ ½     1 ½ 
Consumption per capita (constant 
prices) 4.6 4.2 3.8 -3.3 -7.8 -1 ¼ - ½ - ¾ 
Investment in Housing/GNP 14.9 14.7 13.2 9.8 5.6 3 ½ 3     3 ¼ 
Investment/GNP 31.4 31.2 30.8 25.7 18.8 14     13 ¼ 13 ¾ 
Domestic Demand 9.0 6.4 5.5 -5.2 -13.9 -5     -2     0     
Labour share of GNP 47.5 46.8 48.0 51.3 55.4 53   51 ¾ 51 ¼ 
Measures of 
Performance 
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 According to the Quarterly National Accounts for Q3 2010, industrial 
output grew by 1.4 per cent between Q2 and Q3 (seasonally adjusted). 
However, as can be seen from Figure 10, there continues to be marked 
differences within this sector across construction and non-construction 
industrial activity. Non-building industry grew by almost 3 per cent, thereby 
reversing the contraction which had been observed between Q1 and Q2. 
Comparing the year ending Q3 2010 to the year ending Q3 2009, output 
has increased by over 10 per cent, thereby echoing the strong performance 
of exports as discussed above. The on-going contraction in construction 
activity is also seen in Figure 10, with the latest quarterly fall measured at -
8.2 per cent. Again comparing the year ending in Q3 2009 and 2010, 
construction output is down by almost one third.  
Figure 10: Quarter-on-Quarter Growth Rates in Industry, Seasonally 
 Adjusted 
 
 
With eleven months of data for 2010 now available from the CSO’s 
Index of Industrial Production, it is possible to get a clear sense of what output 
figures for the full year will be. In Figure 11, we show output growth 
figures for the traditional and modern sectors for the twelve month period 
from November to November. As can be seen, the modern sector has seen 
output grow by 8.8 per cent in the twelve months to November 2010. 
Growth in the traditional sector, at just 0.4 per cent in the corresponding 
period, is a good deal lower. However, the most recent signs are more 
encouraging. Comparing the six month period June-November 2010 with 
the corresponding period in 2009, output in the traditional sector has 
increased by 10.7 per cent.  
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Figure 11: Rates of Growth in Industrial Output 2006 to 2010, Based on 
 November to November Comparisons 
 
The services sector continued to shrink in Q3, according to the Quarterly 
National Accounts. As shown in Figure 12, services output fell by 1.7 per 
cent between Q2 and Q3 based on seasonally adjusted data. This rate of 
decline equalled the previous poorest quarters since the start of 2008. All 
three sub-sectors registered declines in output in Q3. For Distribution, 
Transport and Communication the decline was 2.4 per cent; the declines 
for Public Administration and Defence and Other Services (including Rent) 
were 0.1 per cent and 1.6 per cent respectively. 
Figure 12: Quarter-on-Quarter Growth Rates in Services, Seasonally 
 Adjusted 
 
 
As regards our forecasts, we expect services output to grow by ½ per 
cent in 2011 and by 1 per cent 2012. We expect non-building industrial 
output to grow by 5 per cent in 2011 and 2012. We expect building and 
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construction output to fall by 12¼ per cent in 2011 and by a further 2¼ 
per cent in 2012. We expect agricultural output to rise by 2 per cent in 2011 
and by 1 per cent in 2012. 
Box 1: Irish Agriculture in 2010 
 
While overall GDP contracted by 7.6 per cent in 2009, the decline in 
agricultural output and incomes far exceeded the declines recorded in most 
other sectors of the Irish economy. Income in agriculture fell by almost a 
third in 2009, the largest annual decline in the operating surplus based on 
records dating back to 1973. Preliminary estimates from the CSO6 indicate 
that the agriculture sector is likely to have outperformed most other sectors 
of the Irish economy in 2010 with large increases in the value and volume 
of agricultural output recorded over the course of the year. The latest data 
indicate that the operating surplus increased by 46 per cent in 2010, making 
good the losses incurred in 2009.  
 
The fall in agricultural income in 2009 was driven by sharp falls in the 
value of agricultural output, especially milk and cereals, with poor weather 
and flooding also likely to have contributed to the reduction in output. A 
reversal of this trend was seen in 2010 with output at farm gate prices 
increasing by over 16 per cent in value and 6 per cent in volume (Table 
1A). Expenditure on inputs remained broadly unchanged in 2010 (the value 
of intermediate consumption increased by 0.3 per cent) while the deduction 
for depreciation fell by 4.5 per cent from 2008. Combined with the increase 
in output, this contributed to the dramatic increase in the overall operating 
surplus in 2010.  
 
The structure of the agricultural sector is illustrated in Figure 1A which 
shows the share of gross output accounted for by the main commodities. 
In 2009, cattle and milk output accounted for almost 60 per cent of total 
gross output with cereals accounting for around 4 per cent of output. 
Figure 1A: Structure of Agriculture Sector: Main Commodities 
 
                                                          
6 Central Statistics Office, 2010. Output, Input and Income in Agriculture 2010- Preliminary 
Estimates.  
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The main commodity outputs from Irish farms experienced substantial 
price falls in 2009 as shown in Table 1A. The downturn in the international 
economy impacted on global food demand and contributed to the decrease 
in commodity prices observed over the course of 2009. The value of milk 
output declined by almost 33 per cent, due almost entirely to a decrease in 
milk prices. Cereals output declined by over 50 per cent in value and 30 per 
cent in volume. There was also an 11 per cent decline in the value of 
livestock output in 2009, again primarily driven by price falls. The price of 
agricultural commodities recovered strongly in 2010 aided by the upturn in 
the world economy, renewed demand from emerging Asia and tighter 
supplies. Driven by these positive price developments, the value of milk 
output increased by almost 39 per cent in 2010 while the value of livestock 
and cereals output increased by 9 per cent and 89 per cent respectively.  
 
Net value added at basic prices measures the prices farmers receive for 
their output, net of product specific subsidies and taxes. In 2009, this 
declined by 77 per cent to just €195.5 million. The increase in agricultural 
output in 2010 resulted in a strong recovery in net value added at basic 
prices which increased almost seven fold to €930 million in 2010. In 
addition, farmers receive direct payments which in 2010 amounted to €1.8 
billion. Thus, the operating surplus in agriculture increased from €1.6 
billion in 2009 to €2.3 billion in 2009, an increase of 46 per cent.   
 
Table 1A: Output, Input and Income in Agriculture 
 
   2009   2010 Value Volume Price 
 Euro Million Annual % Change 
All Livestock  2,197.8 2,400.5 9.2 8.0 1.1 
Livestock - Cattle  1,450.2 1,627.8 12.2 12.8 -0.5 
Livestock - Pigs  306.7 330.7 7.8 7.4 0.4 
Livestock - Sheep  157.5 169.6 7.7 -7.5 16.4 
All Livestock Products  1,142 1,571.2 37.6 7.1 28.5 
Livestock Products - Milk  1,100.2 1,526.8 38.8 7.2 29.5 
All Crops  1,371.7 1,507.2 9.9 1.6 8.1 
All Cereals  107 202 88.8 7.6 75.5 
Crops - Forage Plants  851.7 857.7 0.7 -1.5 2.2 
Goods Output at Producer Prices  4,711.6 5,478.9 16.3 6.2 9.5 
Contract Work  268.7 268.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Subsidies less Taxes on Products  15.1 10.1    
Agricultural Output at Basic Prices  4,995.4 5,757.7    
Intermediate Consumption  4,070.8 4,083.1    
Gross Value Added at Basic Prices  924.6 1,674.6    
Fixed Capital Consumption  780.6 745.6    
Net Value Added at Basic Prices  144 929.1    
Other Subsidies Less Taxes on 
Production  1,843.8 1,773.4    
Factor Income  1,987.8 2,702.4    
Compensation of Employees  427.7 424.5    
Operating Surplus  1,560.1 2,277.9    
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To derive a measure of farm income at basic prices, it is necessary to 
deduct from net value added at basic prices expenditure by farmers on 
hired labour, interest payments on borrowed capital and land rental. In 
2010, these totalled €424.5 million, €271.8 million and €148.9 million 
respectively. This implies that in 2010, farm income at basic prices was just 
€84 million. The equivalent figure for 2009 was minus €713 million. The 
return to farm enterprises continues to depend almost entirely on direct 
payments paid for by the EU under the CAP and by the Exchequer.7 This 
highlights the dependence of farm enterprises on direct payments, a 
situation which leaves the agricultural sector highly vulnerable to future 
reforms of the CAP and to changes in the EU budget. 
 
Nevertheless the prospects for the dairy sector, which has been 
gradually increasing its share of overall output over time, remains bright. 
Ireland’s grass-based production model gives it a comparative advantage in 
this area. The sector should be well placed to take advantage of the 
expected strong demand for dairy products as a result of income growth, 
urbanisation and favourable demographic trends.8 The planned abolition of 
EU milk quotas in 2015 also presents opportunities for expansion in the 
dairy sector.9  
 
 According to the Quarterly National Household Survey for Q3 2010, there 
were 1.85 million people employed in that quarter. This represented a fall 
of 3.7 per cent on the total employed in the corresponding quarter of 2009. 
While this implies that the economy is still suffering significant job losses, 
this was the slowest pace of employment fall since Q3 of 2008 (as can be 
seen from Figure 13).  The number unemployed stood at 299,000 in Q3, an 
increase of 6.9 per cent on a year earlier. This meant that the 
unemployment rate was 13.9 per cent in Q3 2010, and 13.6 per cent on a 
seasonally adjusted basis. By comparison, the average rate of 
unemployment across the Euro Area is 9.8 per cent (Q2). Within  that 
group of countries, only Spain and Estonia have higher rates of 
unemployment, at 20.1 per cent and 18.6 per cent respectively. 
 
                                                          
7 In addition, payment of capital grants under the Farm Waste Management Scheme is 
expected to exceed €900 million. Payments to farmers under this scheme are being made 
on a phased basis over the period to 2011.  
8 See the FAPRI 2010 World Agricultural Outlook http://www.fapri.iastate.edu/outlook/2010/  
9 The Food Harvest 2020 report published in mid 2010 sets out a strategy for the medium- 
term development of the agri-food sector in Ireland. See 
http://www.agriculture.gov.ie/media/migration/agri-foodindustry/foodharvest2020/ 
foodharvest2020/2020strategy/2020Foodharvest190710.pdf    
Employment 
  
 
 
 
Table 10: GDP by Sector    
        
 2009 % Change 2010 % Change 2011 % Change    2012 
           
 €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn Volume Value €bn 
           
Agriculture 3.0 5     10     3.3 2     5     3.4 1     2     3.5 
           
Industry: 45.6  ¼ -1 ¼ 45.0 2 ¾ 2 ¼ 46.1 4 ¾ 4 ¼ 48.0 
Other Industry 37.5 7     6     39.7 5     4 ½ 41.5 5     4 ½ 43.4 
Building & Construction 8.1 -30 ¼ -34 ¾ 5.3 -12 ¼ -14     4.5 2 ¼ 1 ¼ 4.6 
           
Services: 96.1  ¼ 0     96.1  ½  ¾ 96.8 1     1 ½ 98.4 
  
Public Administration & 
 Defence 6.4 -3     -3 ¾ 6.1 -3     -4     5.9 -2 ½ -4     5.6 
  
Distribution, Transport 
 and Communications 21.8 -2     -4     20.9  ½  ½ 21.0  ½  ½ 21.1 
  
Other Services 
 (including rent) 67.9 1     1 ¾ 69.1 1     1 ¼ 69.9 1 ½ 2 ½ 71.6 
           
GDP at Factor Cost  144.6  ¼ - ¼ 144.4 1 ¼ 1 ¼ 146.3 2 ¼ 2 ½ 149.9 
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Figure 13: Year-on-Year Percentage Change in Employment, Q1 2008 to 
 Q3 2010 
 
The Live Register provides the most up-to-date indicator of trends in 
unemployment and had exhibited some positive signs in the latter part of 
last year. The number on the Live Register peaked in August at 455,000 
(seasonally adjusted). Falls in September, October and November saw this 
number fall to 438,000 in November. However, an increase was seen again 
in December, with the number rising to 444,000. 
 
In recent Commentaries, we have looked at various aspects of the 
employment fall and these all remain important and worrying features of 
Ireland’s labour market. For example, the rate of long-term unemployment 
continues to rise (where long-term is defined as a spell of one year or 
more). In Q3, this rate was 6.5 per cent, up from 5.9 per cent in Q2 and up 
from 3.2 per cent in Q3 2009. The rate of unemployment among the 
youngest age groups is particularly high. It was 36.4 per cent for those aged 
15 to 19 years in Q3 and 25.5 per cent for those aged 20-24 years. 
Participation rates have also fallen for the youngest age groups. For those 
aged 15-19 years, the rate has fallen from 25 per cent in Q3 2008 to 12.8 
per cent in Q3 2010; the corresponding rates for those aged 20-24 years 
were 66.5 per cent in Q3 2008 and 50.7 per cent in Q3 2010. While part of 
the decline in participation may have a positive offset in terms of higher 
participation in education, the impact of the employment downturn on 
younger people is clear. The weakness in the labour market for younger 
people in particular has given rise to the return of emigration and our 
forecasts envisage a continuation of this.  
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Table 11: Employment and Unemployment  
 
 Annual Averages 000s 
     
 2009 2010 2011 2012
  
Agriculture 96 86 89 90 
Industry 411 360 345 345 
Services 1,422 1,405 1,392 1,396 
Total at Work 1,929 1,851 1,826 1,831 
Unemployed 259 287 287 273 
  
Labour Force 2,187 2,138 2,113 2,104 
Unemployment Rate % 11.8 13 ½ 13 ½ 13 
Net Migration -7.8 -34.5 -60.0 -40.0 
   of which: Inward Migration 57.3 30.8 15.0 20.0 
Change in Participation Rate* -1.2 -1               ¼           ½ 
     
Note: Participation rate measured as share of population aged 15-64 years; Both 
participation rate and the migration figures are based on Q2 figures in each year. 
 
 
Turning to our forecasts, we expect employment to average 1.83 million 
in 2011, down 25,000 on the 2010 figure (or minus 1¼ per cent). Although 
the economy is expected to grow in 2011, the output growth will be 
achieved through productivity growth alone. For 2012, we expect 
employment to rise although the pace of increase, at just ¼ per cent, is 
expected to be miniscule. As with 2011, productivity growth will dominate. 
For both 2011 and 2012, the expected absence of any significant 
employment growth is related in part to the fact that growth is expected to 
come via the export sector. This is less employment intensive than the 
domestic sectors of the economy. We expect the rate of unemployment to 
average 13 ½ per cent in 2011 and for it to fall to 13 per cent in 2012. But 
as noted in the preceding paragraph, a part of this fall in the rate of 
unemployment in 2012, and indeed the stability in the rate between 2010 
and 2011, is explained by our view on emigration. We expect net outward 
migration to be 60,000 in the year to April 2011 and 40,000 in the 
subsequent twelve months.  
 
 In Table 12, we show year on year changes in weekly earnings, hourly 
earnings and hours worked, covering all employees and for the year ending 
Q3 2010. Across all sectors, all three items show declines – weekly earnings 
have fallen by 1.4 per cent as a result of falls in hours worked (minus 0.3 
per cent) and in hourly earnings (minus 1.2 per cent). Looking across the 
various sectors, the larger falls in hourly earnings are seen in the lower part 
of the table, in sectors such as public administration, education and health. 
Clearly these falls are related to the public sector pay cuts which were 
announced in Budget 2010 and which took effect at the beginning of 2010. 
This point is illustrated more clearly if we look at the public/private 
comparisons which are included in the CSO’s release on Earnings and 
Labour Costs Q2 2010-Q3 2010 (Preliminary Estimates). Over the year ending 
Q3 2010, hourly earnings fell by 0.2 per cent in the private sector and by 
4.6 per cent in the public sector. For weekly earnings, the corresponding 
figures are minus 0.3 in the private sector and minus 4.5 in the public 
Incomes 
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sector. Hence, although declining wages are evident across the economy, 
the pace of decline is much higher in the public sector. 
Table 12: Year-on-Year Percentage Change in Earnings and Hours Worked, All 
Employees, 2010 Q3 
  
 Weekly Earnings Hourly Earnings Weekly Hours 
Worked 
 
All NACE economic sectors -1.4 
 
-1.2 
 
-0.3 
 
Industry (B to E) 5.8 
 
1.4 
 
4.4 
 
Mining and quarrying (B) -4.4 
 
-11.9 
 
8.5 
 
Manufacturing (C) 6.0 
 
1.4 
 
4.7 
 
Electricity, water supply and waste 
management (D,E) 
6.1 
 
5.3 
 
0.8 
 
Construction (F) -6.2 
 
-3.0 
 
-3.4 
 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles (G) 
0.8 
 
1.6 
 
-0.6 
 
Transportation and storage (H) -0.3 
 
-1.5 
 
1.4 
 
Accommodation and food service 
activities (I) 
-1.1 
 
-0.7 
 
-0.4 
 
Information and communication (J) 5.8 
 
3.8 
 
1.9 
 
Financial, insurance and real estate 
activities (K,L) 
3.2 
 
1.3 
 
2.1 
 
Professional, scientific and technical 
activities (M) 
-3.1 
 
-0.8 
 
-2.5 
 
Administrative and support service 
activities (N) 
-4.5 
 
-7.1 
 
2.7 
 
Public administration and defence; 
compulsory social security (O) 
-5.8 
 
-5.1 
 
-0.6 
 
Education (P) 
 
-12.3 
 
-5.1 
 
-7.6 
 
Human health and social work 
activities (Q) 
 
-4.9 
 
-6.7 
 
2.0 
 
Arts, entertainment, recreation and 
other service activities (R,S) 
 
6.8 
 
6.5 
 
0.0 
 
Source: Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs Survey (EHECS), CSO. 
 
Turning to our forecasts, we expect nominal wages to fall by 1 per cent 
in 2011 and to be stable in 2012. As wages began falling in 2009 (when they 
fell by 0.8 per cent) this implies a prolonged period of falling or stagnating 
wages. The cumulated reduction by the end of 2011 will be around 5 per 
cent. Combining declines in wages and employment in 2011 and stagnation 
in 2012, non-agricultural wage income is forecast to fall by 2½ per cent in 
2011 and to rise marginally in 2012, by ¼ per cent. Nominal cuts in social 
welfare rates will likely lead to falls in current transfer income in 2011 and 
2012. We expect personal disposable income to fall by 1 per cent in 2011 
before rising in 2012 by ¼ per cent. With consumption expected to be 
subdued in 2011 and 2012, we expect the savings rate to remain high at 
over 12 per cent in 2011 and 11¾ per cent in 2012. 
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Consumer prices, as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), increased 
moderately throughout 2010. This trend reversed the year-on-year price 
decline in mid 2010, although the pace of price inflation slowed 
considerably in the later part of the year, as seen in Figure 14. The latest 
CPI figures indicate that prices were 0.6 per cent higher in November 2010 
than in November 2009, but are still more than 6 per cent lower than their 
peak in 2008. Inflation for 2010 is estimated to have been -1 per cent on 
average. 
Figure 14: Price Indices – Year-On-Year Percentage Change 
 
Upward pressure on price inflation stems mainly from the mortgage 
interest rate component of the CPI. The average variable mortgage rate fell 
sharply from 5.87 in August of 2008 to 3.16 in June 2009, and remained 
low for the rest of 2009 and the beginning of 2010 due to the continuing 
low interest rate policy employed by the European Central Bank. Due to 
the ongoing difficulties faced by Irish banks seeking to borrow on 
international markets, mortgage interest rates began to increase in the latter 
half of 2010. The average variable mortgage rate stood at 3.87 in 
November 2010, 15 per cent higher than it had been twelve months 
previously. CPI excluding mortgage interest was down 0.7 per cent over the 
same period, indicating that the real economy remains in a deflationary 
mode. 
Consumer 
Prices 
  
 
Table 13: Personal Disposable Income    
2009 Change 2010 Change   2011 Change 2012 
 
€bn % €bn €bn % €bn €bn % €bn €bn
           
Agriculture, etc. 2.2 10     0.2 2.4 5     0.1 2.5 2     0.1 2.6 
Non-Agricultural Wages 72.7 -6 ½ -4.8 67.9 -2 ½ -1.7 66.1  ¼ 0.1 66.3 
Other Non-Agricultural Income 16.6 10 ¼ 1.7 18.3 13 ½ 2.5 20.7 8 ¼ 1.7 22.4 
           
Total Income Received 91.4 -3     -2.9 88.6 1     0.9 89.4 2     1.9 91.3 
Current Transfers 27.0 -2 ¾ -0.8 26.2 -4 ¼ -1.1 25.1 - ½ -0.1 25.0 
           
Gross Personal Income 118.4 -3     -3.6 114.8 - ¼ -0.3 114.5 1 ½ 1.8 116.3 
Direct Personal Taxes 21.6 -3 ½ -0.8 20.8 3 ½ 0.7 21.5 7 ¼ 1.6 23.1 
           
Personal Disposable Income  96.8 -3     -2.8 94.0 -1     -1.0 93.0  ¼ 0.2 93.2 
Consumption 84.3 -3     -2.5 81.8 - ¼ -0.2 81.6  ¾ 0.6 82.2 
Personal Savings 12.5   12.2   11.4   11.0 
Savings Ratio 12.9   13       12 ¼   11 ¾ 
Average Personal Tax Rate 18.2   18       18 ¾   19 ¾ 
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Further upward pressure on the price level has come from increased 
home and health insurance costs. The insurance component of the CPI had 
been a depressing influence on price inflation since the beginning of 2009, 
but health insurance in particular has been a significant contributor to 
inflation in the second half of 2010. The recently announced price increases 
in this sector will reinforce its inflationary impact in 2011. 
 
More components of the CPI are exerting downward pressure on price 
inflation than upward pressure, which is a testament to the contraction in 
domestic demand. Deflationary components of CPI include new and 
second-hand motorcars, alcohol, clothing and footwear. Prices have also 
fallen significantly in the hotel and restaurant sectors, which is unsurprising 
given the struggling tourism sector and constrained domestic disposable 
income. 
 
For 2011, we are forecasting CPI inflation to average 2 per cent, driven by 
the factors mentioned above, as well as high oil prices which are currently 
trading at over $90 a barrel. Inflationary pressures will ease somewhat in 
2012, when we are forecasting a 1½ per cent increase in the price level. In 
terms of HICP inflation, we are forecasting increases of 1 per cent in both 
2011 and 2012. 
 
 
 
PRIVATE SECTOR CREDIT 
The annual rate of change in lending to households and non-financial 
corporations turned negative during late 2009 and that trend has continued 
in recent months (Figure 15). The net flow of household lending (which 
accounts for around 43 per cent of the stock of private sector credit 
outstanding) has been negative in every month since the beginning of 2010. 
This indicates that the repayment of debt exceeded the drawdown of new 
credit in each month. The level of credit outstanding to households has 
declined by almost €20 billion from its peak of €157 billion in May 2008 to 
just over €137 billion in October 2010, reflecting the ongoing process of 
deleveraging underway in the household sector. 
Figure 15: Private Sector Credit, Annual Rate of Change 
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The annual rate of change in lending to the non-financial corporate 
(NFC) sector has been negative since late 2009 and the contraction in 
lending to this sector has continued in recent months. The transactions 
data from the Central Bank indicate that loan repayment by the NFC sector 
exceeded the drawdown of new credit by over €190 million in November. 
The decline in lending to the NFC sector continues to be driven by the 
contraction in long-term loans with a maturity of over five years. The 
annual rate of change in loans to the NFC sector has been negative since 
late 2009 and the pace of decline has accelerated in recent months. The 
annual rate of change in lending to the NFC sector, which strips out the 
impact of reclassifications, revaluations, exchange rate valuations and any 
other changes which arise from transactions, stood at -2 per cent in 
November.  
 
Recent Commentaries have drawn attention to changes in the flow of 
funds between sectors in the Irish economy. The decline in the financial 
liabilities of the household and company sectors, as shown in the latest 
statistics on private sector debt outstanding, is reflected by developments in 
the flow of funds. Our forecasts imply that as a result of the decline in the 
financing needs of the household sector as well as the increase in the 
savings rate (projected to average 13 in 2010), the rate of net acquisitions of 
assets by the household and company sectors should remain in surplus in 
2011 and 2012 as seen in Figure 16. 
Figure 16: Flow of Funds 1998-2010 (2011 and 2012 Derived from 
 Forecasts) 
 
 
CREDIT CONDITIONS 
The latest results of the euro area Bank Lending Survey (BLS) point to a 
continuing weakness in credit demand while credit supply remains 
restrictive. Credit standards on loans to enterprises and households 
tightened substantially over the course of 2008 and the Q3 2010 results of 
the BLS contain no evidence of an easing in credit supply standards (Table 
14 and Figure 17). Credit standards on loans to both enterprises and 
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households were unchanged during Q3, indicating that the tight credit 
supply conditions which existed in the second quarter of the year persisted 
during Q3. Costs related to the banks’ capital position, more restrictive 
liquidity positions and increased perception of risk all contributed to the 
restrictive credit environment during the quarter.  
Table 14: Irish Responses to ECB Bank Lending Survey, Change in Credit 
Standards from Previous Quarter10 
       
  
Q3 
2009 
Q4 
2009 
Q1 
2010 
Q2 
2010 
Q3 
2010 
Enterprises Overall 2.9 3.0 3.0 2.9 3.0 
 Loans to SMEs 2.9 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.9 
 Loans to large enterprises 2.9 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.9 
 Short-term loans 2.9 3.0 3.0 2.9 3.0 
 Long-term loans 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.9 
Households House purchase 2.9 3.0 2.9 2.9 3.0 
 
Consumer credit and other 
lending 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.0 
 
Credit standards on loans to households for house purchase and 
consumer credit and other lending also remained tight during the third 
quarter of 2010. Banks reported that access to wholesale funding markets 
deteriorated during the third quarter of 2010 and that ongoing financial 
market uncertainty impacted on costs related to banks’ capital position.  
Figure 17: Credit Supply Conditions as Reported by Banks, Change from 
 Previous Quarter 
The Central Bank recently released new data11 on lending to Irish small 
and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). The trends in SME lending in the 
                                                          
10 Banks were asked, using a five point scale, how credit standards on loans to enterprises 
and households changed during Q3 2010 relative to the second quarter of 2010. Banks 
were also asked two ad-hoc questions in the October version of the Bank Lending Survey. 
11 For details see http://www.centralbank.ie/data/site/cmbs/SME%20Lending.pdf  
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first nine months of 2010 are consistent with the findings from the Bank 
Lending Survey discussed above which point to tight credit supply conditions 
in lending markets. In the six months to the end of the third quarter, total 
SME lending declined by 5.1 per cent while lending to core SME sectors 
declined by 4.5 per cent over the same period. This indicates that 
repayments on SME loans have been greater than the amount of new SME 
credit extended over the period.  
BANK FUNDING 
The final months of 2010 have proven traumatic for the Irish banking 
system as fragile Irish banks faced the twin challenges of having to roll over 
large quantities of debt as well as coping with a loss of deposits. As a result 
of these difficulties, Irish banks were forced to draw heavily on funding 
from both the European Central Bank and the Central Bank of Ireland. 
Since the emergence of tensions in interbank lending markets in late 2008, 
the Eurosystem through the ECB has provided liquidity to Central Banks 
through its Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) and through 
the adoption of a series of non-standard measures. These measures 
succeeded in bringing about a gradual improvement in international money 
market conditions over the course of 2009 and the early months of 2010.  
Table 15: Credit Institutions Borrowing from the Central Bank in  
Billions (€)12 
  
Lending by 
the Irish 
Central Bank 
to Credit 
Institutions 
in Ireland in 
Euro 
Eurosystem 
Net Lending 
to Euro Area 
Credit 
Institutions in 
Euro, Related 
to MPO 
Irish 
Share 
Credit 
Institutions' 
Borrowing 
from the 
Central 
Bank, % of 
GDP 
2007 March 24.0 421.6 5.7 12.7 
 June 25.5 438.0 5.8 13.5 
 September 23.8 420.2 5.7 12.5 
 December 39.4 475.3 8.3 21.0 
2008 March 34.4 483.6 7.1 19.0 
 June 38.4 460.6 8.3 21.2 
 September 58.7 471.4 12.4 39.2 
 December 88.6 613.9 14.4 54.0 
2009 March 120.6 607.4 19.9 79.8 
 June 130.4 616.0 21.2 83.9 
 September 91.6 583.9 15.7 53.9 
 December 90.9 564.5 16.1 56.9 
2010 March 82.6 511.5 16.1 52.0 
 May 90.5 534.9 16.9 56.9 
 August 95.1 427.3 22.2 59.8 
 November 136.4 403.4 33.8 75.0 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 These data relate to all credit institutions operating within the state, including those with 
no significant business with the Irish resident households and NFCs.   
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Credit Institutions’ borrowing from the Eurosystem, which had peaked 
in June 2009 at over €130 billion, fell back gradually during the second half 
of 2009 to stand at around €83 billion by the end of March 2010, reflecting 
the gradual normalisation of interbank markets and the fall in interbank 
lending rates (Table 15 and Figure 18). The sovereign debt crisis in Greece 
which escalated during April and May this year sparked renewed tensions in 
euro area bank funding markets with the result that the ECB announced 
the establishment of the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) as well as 
the continuation of its three-month and six-month longer-term refinancing 
operations.    
Figure 18: Net Foreign Liabilities of the Banking System (Domestic 
 Group) and  Banks’ Borrowing from the Central Bank13  
 
 
Contagion from the Greek crisis as well as renewed concern 
surrounding the extent of the property-related losses in the Irish banks 
resulted in increasingly hostile conditions for Irish banks in interbank 
lending markets From July, banks’ borrowing from the Eurosystem began 
to increase significantly and reached over €136 billion in November 2010, 
of which €97 billion was borrowed by domestic credit institutions. Table 16 
below contains, in summary form, the balance sheets of the Central Bank 
of Ireland and these domestic banks. The bottom panel of Table 16 
highlights the contraction in the balance sheet of domestic market credit 
institutions. The total liabilities of the domestic banking system were 3.4 
per cent lower in November 2010 compared to November 2009 with a 
particularly large fall in the net foreign liabilities of the banking system as 
shown in Figure 18. A continuation of the recent trend of debt repayment 
                                                          
13 These data relate to domestic market credit institutions. Domestic market credit 
institutions are those who have a significant level of retail business with Irish households 
and NFCs, and would exclude the more internationally focussed banks in the IFSC but 
includes Rabobank and Ulster Bank. A full list of these institutions is available from 
http://www.centralbank.ie/data/site/cmbs/Credit%20Institutions%20Resident%20in%2
0the%20Republic%20of%20Ireland.pdf 
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exceeding the drawdown of new credit should result in a further decline in 
the balance sheet of domestic credit market institutions. 
Table 16: Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Ireland and Domestic Banks 
Central Bank Balance Sheet    26/11/2008    27/11/2009    26/11/2010 
 €bn €bn €bn 
Total Liabilities 110.9 107.6 202.4 
       
Assets 110.9 107.6 202.4 
of which:      
 Lending to euro area credit institutions 
relating to monetary policy operations in 
euro 88.3 78.7 136.4 
    
 Other Claims on Euro Area and Non 
Euro Area residents 14.8 18.2 21.1 
Other Assets 7.6 10. 6 44.7 
Domestic Banks Balance Sheet    30/11/2008    30/11/2009    30/11/2010 
Total Liabilities 819.9 793.9 766.6 
of which:      
 Deposits 587. 3 553.2 469.7 
  of which:      
   Irish residents, private sector 165.7 176.1 160.4 
   Non-residents 293.6 241.9 172.6 
   Other deposits 128.0 135.2 136.6 
 Capital and reserves 42.5 50.3 50.6 
 Borrowing from the Eurosystem relating 
to monetary policy operations 47.7 45.1 97.3 
 Other liabilities 142.4 145.4 149.1 
Total Assets 819.9 793.9 766.6 
 
The reduction in total deposits in domestic Irish banks is also evident 
from Table 16. It is important to note, however, that the fall in total 
deposits has been driven by a reduction in deposits from non-residents 
outside the euro area. Deposits from the Irish resident private sector 
(including households and NFCs) in November 2010 were €15 billion 
lower than in November 2009 while deposits from non-residents were over 
€68 billion lower. 
 
The reduction in the deposit base of the domestic banking system as 
well as uncertainty regarding the extent of banks’ property related loans 
which made it difficult for these banks to borrow on interbank markets has 
resulted in an increased level of dependence by domestic banks on funding 
from the Eurosystem as shown in the bottom panel of Table 16. In 
addition, domestic banks’ borrowing from the Irish Central Bank has 
increased sharply with the “other assets” component of the Central Bank’s 
balance sheet increasing from €9.1 billion in October 2009 to over €34.6 
billion in October 2010 and almost €45 billion in November (Table 16). 
This increasing level of dependence on Central Bank funds and the related 
concern of the ECB regarding its exposure to Irish banks were 
undoubtedly important factors in precipitating the series of events which 
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culminated in Ireland’s application for external EU/IMF financial 
assistance.      
 
A critical component of the EU/IMF assistance package is the 
commitment by the ECB to maintain the funding it provides to the Irish 
banking system. Clearly the Irish banking system and consequently the 
Irish State would face severe difficulties in the absence of recourse to the 
exceptional funding provided by the Eurosystem. The commitment by the 
ECB as part of the EU/IMF deal to continue to provide this support to 
the Irish banking system is an extremely welcome aspect of the overall 
programme for financial assistance.  
 
Nevertheless, the Irish banking system cannot rely on this support 
indefinitely. Following the agreement signed with the EU/IMF, Bank of 
Ireland and AIB are to receive an additional €10 billion in capital. The 
banks will also be subject to a new round of stress tests in early 2011 which 
it is hoped will provide greater certainty on the extent of the losses in the 
banks and the adequacy of their current capital buffers. While the 
additional capital being provided to the banks increases the gross cost of 
the bank rescue (Table 17), these steps are vital to ensuring that the Irish 
banking system is repaired swiftly and is in a position to lend to households 
and businesses as the economy recovers.       
LATEST STEPS IN RESOLVING THE BANKING CRISIS 
As part of the programme of support negotiated by the Irish government 
with the European Union, European Central Bank and the IMF, the 
Central Bank set a new minimum capital requirement for AIB, Bank of 
Ireland, Irish Life and Permanent (ILP) and EBS of 10.5 per cent core tier 
1. The Central Bank also instructed the banks to raise sufficient capital to 
achieve a capital ratio of at least 12 per cent core tier 1 by the end of 
February 2011 for AIB, BOI and EBS and end of May in the case of ILP. 
The implications of these new capital raising targets for each of the banks 
are as follows: 
 
• AIB is now required to raise an additional €5.3 billion core tier 1 
capital bringing the total amount of core tier 1 capital that the bank 
must raise before February 28 to €9.8 billion. In December 2010, 
the bank received a net capital injection of €3.7 billion from the 
State. 
• Bank of Ireland is required to raise an additional €2.2 billion core 
tier 1 capital by end-February 2011.  
• EBS has been instructed to raise an additional €438 million in core 
tier 1 capital by the February deadline bringing the total EBS must 
raise to €963 million. In December 2010 €525 million of capital was 
injected into EBS building society by the State, leaving it with €438 
million to raise to meet the revised target. 
• ILP must raise an additional €98 million in core tier 1 capital 
bringing the total amount to be raised by end-May to €243 million. 
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At the time of writing it is unclear how much of this additional capital 
will be raised from private investors. On the assumption that the state is 
required to provide all of the funds necessary to recapitalise AIB and EBS, 
this would increase the gross cost of the bank rescue to €53 billion or 33 
per cent of GDP (Table 17).14  
Table 17: Overview of Existing and Estimated State Support to the 
 Banking System 
   
Cost of Bank Recapitalisation 
€ 
Billion 
Percentage
of GDP 
 Allied Irish Bank (1) 13.3 8.3 
 Bank of Ireland (2) 3.5 2.2 
 EBS Building Society (3) 1.3 0.8 
     
 Anglo Irish Bank (4) 29.3 18.4 
 Irish Nationwide Building Society (5) 5.4 3.4 
     
Total gross cost to date (6)=(1+2+3+4+5) 52.8 33.1 
Total net cost to date (7)=(4+5) 34.7 21.7 
     
Potential Additional Cost    
 Anglo Irish Bank (8) 5.0 3.1 
Total gross potential cost (9)= (6+8) 57.8 36.2 
     
Payment planned for loans under NAMA (10) 40.0 25.1 
Total government involvement in the banking system 
(11)=(9+10) 97.8 61.3 
   
  
 
 
  
                                                          
14 This is a technical assumption. On 13 January 2011 AIB announced a liability 
management exercise which could raise between €1.1 billion and €1.7 billion based on a 
take-up of 40 per cent to 60 per cent by bondholders. To the extent that this LME is 
successful this will reduce the cost to the state as shown in Table 17. To date Bank of 
Ireland has raised some €740 million of its capital requirement through an LME exercise 
(€700m) and the sale of Bank of Ireland Asset Management to State Street Global 
Advisors (€40m). It intends to generate the remaining required capital through a 
combination of internal capital management initiatives, support from existing shareholders 
and other capital markets sources.   
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GENERAL ASSESSMENT 
  At the time of the last Commentary, the dominant immediate concern 
facing the country was whether Ireland was going to be able to continue 
borrowing on international markets to fund the public deficit. It became 
clear soon after the publication of that Commentary that the cost of 
borrowing was reaching levels whereby Ireland’s funding needs could not 
be met on the international markets. In December, the IMF/EU bailout 
was agreed and so this is the first Commentary to be written in this new 
context. 
 
The first point that should be addressed with relation to the bailout 
agreement is how the forecasts contained here compare to those contained 
in Budget 2011. Our forecasts allow us to assess whether we think the 
outcomes for 2011 and 2012 that were envisaged in Budget 2011 are likely 
to be met. This comparison suggests that there may be slippage. Looking 
firstly at the GDP forecasts, Budget 2011 contained forecast growth rates 
of 0.3 per cent, 1.7 per cent and 3.2 per cent for the years 2010, 2011 and 
2012 respectively. Our forecasts are for GDP growth rates of ¼ per cent in 
2010 followed by 1½ per cent in 2011 and 2¼ per cent in 2012. Budget 
2011 forecast a GDP level of €168 billion in 2012; based on our forecasts, 
we expect the level to be €165 billion, a difference of 2 per cent. Partly as a 
result of our lower forecasts for GDP growth, the debt to GDP ratio that 
emerges from our forecasts is higher than that in Budget 2011. We forecast 
that the debt ratio will be 104.5 per cent of GDP in 2012 while the forecast 
figure in Budget 2011 was 102 per cent.   
 
Given the uncertainty which surrounds all forecasts, we would not place 
too great an emphasis on the difference. Instead, we would see it as a 
reminder of the on-going challenges which the country faces in restoring 
the public finances to a sustainable path. In that context and as discussed 
above, tax revenues seem to have stabilised during 2010. Under our 
forecasts, the deficit is below 10 per cent of GDP in 2011 (9½. per cent), 
an important psychological threshold. It falls to 7¾ per cent in 2012 so the 
trajectory is in line with achieving a 3 per cent deficit by 2015/2016. We 
should also note that under our forecasts, the balance of payments surplus 
exceeds 2 per cent of GNP in 2012. As this points to a paying down of 
external debt by the public and private sectors combined, it can be viewed 
as a positive sign for the economy. 
 
Budget 2011 was the first budget to be delivered as part of the National 
Recovery Plan 2011 to 2014 and under the terms of the EU/IMF bailout. 
The on-going determination of the Government to restore the public 
finances to a sustainable path is, of course, correct. In our view, the extent 
of income tax increases was one negative feature of the budget, especially 
when taken in the context of a failure to implement a tax on primary 
residential properties. The need to broaden the tax base has been a 
recurring theme in work undertaken by the ESRI. We expect that a 
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property tax will form part of future elements in on-going programme of 
adjustment, as indicated in the recovery plan.  
 
While we expect the economy to register positive rates of growth in 
2011 and 2012, the rates which we envisage will be sluggish, especially 
when compared to the scale of the recent decline. On-going uncertainty 
about employment stability and future movements in wages and taxation 
will continue to dampen consumption. The crisis in banking is likely to lead 
to continued funding difficulties for the SME sector.  As a result of both 
depressed consumer demand and lower expansion by SMEs, employment 
growth will remain very weak. To the extent that employment creation 
would amount to the most tangible reality of the recession having ended, 
our forecasts imply on-going pressures for people. As discussed above, the 
rate of unemployment is expected to average 13 per cent in 2012 while the 
net outflow of people between April 2010 and April 2012 is forecast to be 
100,000. When combined with the outflow which was recorded for the year 
ending April 2010, this would imply a net outflow of 135,000 between 2009 
and 2012. The highest rate of net outflow in the 1980s occurred in 1989 
when the rate reached 44,000. Hence, our forecast for an average annual 
net outflow of 50,000 between April 2010 and April 2012 is high in historic 
terms, albeit against a larger population base. 
 
Looking beyond Ireland, the debt crisis in the Euro Area remains a 
source of concern and adds uncertainty to the forecasting context. 
Although Portugal and Spain were able to auction bonds in the week of 
January 10, yields were high and so the possibility remains of a need to 
expand the rescue measures that were extended to Ireland and Greece. Our 
European partners continue to discuss mechanisms through which greater 
certainty can be achieved with respect to dealing with acute sovereign 
problems among Euro Area countries. This is a positive development but 
policy initiatives in this area are likely to be accompanied by a greater 
surveillance of national fiscal policies by European bodies. 
 
In summary, our forecasts suggest that the debt to GDP ratio in 2012 
would be higher than the ratio which was forecast in Budget 2011. 
However, in the context of the uncertainties which surround our forecasts, 
we would not place any significant emphasis on this difference. What is of 
greater concern is the on-going debt crisis in the Euro Area, in terms of 
both financial instability and the possible negative policy consequences for 
Ireland. 
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A GOOD NEWS STORY ABOUT IRISH 
HEALTH CARE 
*Richard Layte 
Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
 
 
 Life expectancy for older people in Ireland has been increasing steadily 
since the 1980s. Despite this, Irish life expectancies for the over 65s lagged 
seriously behind the EU average as recently as the mid 1990s. But Irish 
death rates for the over 65s dropped dramatically between 2000 and 2005, 
moving Ireland closer to the European average. Whereas between 1996 and 
1999 death rates (from all causes) in Ireland had fallen by just over 5%, 
between 2000 and 2004 the decrease was over 26%. What lies behind this 
rare and welcome good news story? An article** by researchers from the 
ESRI and the Department of Pharmacology and Therapeutics at Trinity 
College Dublin sets out the background to this sharp fall in death rates, and  
examines how the greater use of effective drug therapies contributed to this 
result. 
 
The fall in mortality was particularly pronounced for diseases of the 
circulatory system such as heart disease and strokes where there was a 30% 
reduction between 2000 and 2005. This was an extraordinary development 
that, if sustained, had huge implications for the provision of services to 
older Irish people such as pensions and health care. Looking around for 
clues some noticed that the fall in the rate of deaths was particularly 
pronounced in the winter months (See Figure 1). Ireland sees 21% more 
deaths in the depths of winter than in high summer (almost twice the 
Danish proportion), largely from the interaction of low temperature with 
existing cardiovascular and respiratory conditions so analysts initially 
looked to global warming for an explanation. Analysis of weather trends 
showed no warming during recent winters so what could explain the drop 
in death rates? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*richard.layte@esri.ie 
Figure 1: Deaths from Circulatory Diseases In Ireland Per 1000 
People Aged 65+
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One possible explanation may lie in changing prescribing patterns in 
Ireland. Since 1995 there has been a steady year on year increase in the 
number of items prescribed but around the turn of the century, the rate of 
prescribing increased significantly. Between 1995 and 1999 the number of 
items per patient increased by 26% whereas between 2000 and 2004 the 
increase was 53%. Doctors also appeared to be prescribing more expensive 
medicines after 1999. The average cost per item increased by 64% between 
1995 and 1999 compared to 122% 2000-2005 even though pharmaceutical 
inflation had been negligible. The increasing volume and cost of 
pharmaceuticals prescribed meant steeply increasing HSE expenditures on 
pharmaceuticals after 2000 (see Figure 2). A large part of this increase in 
items and expenditure was due to the increased prescribing of 
cardiovascular medicines. These had been increasing since the late 1990s 
following the Irish Cardiovascular Strategy but rates of prescribing grew 
quickly following the introduction of the medical card for over 70s in the 
July of 2001 and the subsequent increase in use of primary care by older 
people (see Layte et al 2009). Between 1999 and 2003 the volume of ace 
inhibitors prescribed almost doubled, the volume of beta blockers more 
than doubled, while the volume of statins prescribed more than trebled.   
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Figure 2: HSE Expenditure on Pharmaceuticals 1997-2005 
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Could this change in prescribing explain the sudden fall in mortality 
among older Irish people? The timing of the change in prescribing seems 
plausible and it is known that drugs such as beta blockers and ace inhibitors 
can counteract some of the strains placed on the cardiovascular system by 
cold weather.  
 
Using data on patterns of mortality across age and sex groups and 
prescribing patterns by year and quarter between 1995 and 2005 the 
researchers showed that there was indeed a change, or ‘structural break’ in 
the pattern of mortality in Ireland around the turn of the century. After 
1999 for instance, excess winter mortality fell by 9% among Irish men and 
6.8% among Irish women. Further analysis showed that this change could 
be explained by increased prescribing of beta blockers, ace inhibitors and 
aspirin medications.  
 
Such falls in mortality are a cause for celebration and mean thousands of 
people are alive today who would otherwise have died. It is likely that these 
cardiovascular medications are also contributing to the significant decrease 
in disability among older Irish people experienced in recent years. The 
effect also underlines the important role played by primary care in the Irish 
health care system. As well as keeping many people alive, this prescribing 
also prevented many older Irish people from experiencing the heart attacks 
and strokes that would have otherwise occurred and in so doing, saved the 
Irish hospital system a great deal of resources. This is a good example of 
the importance of treatment protocols since some of the change is 
attributable to the cardiovascular strategy and secondary prevention. 
However, the change in prescribing was most marked after the change in 
eligibility for the medical card. This shows the benefits that accrue from 
providing primary care free at the point of delivery and keeping prescribing 
fees modest. Early use of primary care prevents more serious illness later 
and helps to move healthcare from expensive public hospitals to relatively 
less expensive primary care settings. This research also suggests that taking 
medical cards from some over 70s and the recent introduction of the 50c 
prescribing fee may impact on health and mortality in Ireland. Drug 
budgets have increased strongly in recent years and there are good grounds 
to believe that we can and should reduce prescribing expenditure. In doing 
so we should not lose sight of the fact that medical treatments both save 
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lives and help people live productive lives with chronic illnesses that would 
have been profoundly disabling two decades ago.  
 
 
 
**LAYTE, R., O’HARA, S. and BENNETT, K. (August .4th 2010). 
Explaining structural change in cardiovascular mortality in Ireland 
1995–2005: a time series analysis, European Journal of Public Health, 
Advanced Access Publication (http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ 
eurpub/ckq100). 
 
 
† LAYTE, R., NOLAN, A., MCGEE, H. and O’HANLON, A. (2009) Do 
consultation charges deter general practitioner use among older 
people? A natural experiment. Social Science and Medicine, Volume 
68, pp. 1432-1438.  
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ON INTERNATIONAL EQUITY 
WEIGHTS AND NATIONAL 
DECISION MAKING ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE 
David Anthoffa and Richard S.J. Tolb,c,d 
 
a Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of 
California, Berkeley, USA 
b Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
c Institute for Environmental Studies and Department of Spatial 
Economics, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
d Department of Economics, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland 
 
 Climate change is a moral problem. The main reason to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions is a concern for faraway lands (Schelling 2000), 
distant futures (Nordhaus 1982), and remote probabilities (Weitzman 
2009). The people who emit most are least affected by climate change, and 
the benefits of their abatement would be diffused. Carbon dioxide dwells in 
the atmosphere for decades and the effects on temperature and sea level 
play out over even longer periods. On central projections  climate change 
and its impacts are a nuisance for rich countries and a problem for poor 
countries. But there is a chance that things will go horribly wrong. If you 
do not care about risk, the future, or other people, then you have little 
reason to care about climate change. 
 
In a recent paper (Anthoff and Tol 2010), we propose a novel way to 
evaluate the impact of climate change on other people. In the early days of 
cost-benefit analyses of climate policy, researchers estimated the impacts of 
climate change on different countries, monetised them based on local 
values, and added up the dollar terms to arrive at an estimate of the world 
total damage (Pearce et al. 1996). In turn, this was used to estimate the 
social cost of carbon – the level at which greenhouse gas emissions should 
be taxed. 
 
This method is simple but ignores the fact that  a dollar is worth more 
to a poor woman than to a rich one. Another objection is that a risk to life 
in a poor country is valued differently than a risk to life in a rich country. 
Therefore, analysts proposed to use equity weights (Fankhauser et al. 1997). 
Essentially, impacts are valued locally but national estimates are weighted 
when aggregating to the global total, with the weights correcting for 
income differences. 
 
richard.tol@esri.ie 
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However, this method is inappropriate for national decisions. Equity 
weights presume a global welfare function. In other words, a global, 
benevolent planner would use equity weights. That does not mean, 
however, that a national government should do the same. Particularly, 
equity weights are less than one for rich countries. If the government of a 
rich country uses equity weights to estimate the carbon price, then it 
discounts the impacts on its own electorate while emphasizing the impacts 
in other jurisdictions (Anthoff et al. 2009). 
 
We propose four alternative ways in which a national government might 
value impacts in other regions of the world when computing a social cost 
of carbon that could be used in domestic cost benefit analysis. Each 
method considers the domestic impacts as valued in the home country, but 
the methods use different principles to consider impacts abroad: 
 
1. Sovereignty: Ignore impacts abroad. 
2. Altruism: Empathise with people abroad. 
3. Good neighbour: Feel guilty if damage is done to people 
abroad. 
4. Liability: Compensate if damage is done to people abroad. 
The first principle stands out. The differences between the other three 
principles are  more subtle. An altruist cares about others in general, while a 
good neighbour cares about what she does to others. An altruist may be 
tempted to try and solve all the worlds problems through climate policy 
(although with the right separability conditions this point is moot at the 
margin). A good neighbour would consider the impacts as they are 
perceived by the victims and therefore use the victims’ discount rates. If 
you are liable for future damage, you use your own discount rate. 
 
We use FUND, an integrated assessment model, to estimate the social 
cost of carbon, the additional damage done if one extra tonne of carbon 
dioxide is emitted today. Figure 1 shows the results, assuming a pure rate of 
time preference of 1% per year and an inequality aversion of 1. The sum of 
the regional social costs (“cooperation”) is $16/tC (in $1995), well within 
the range of estimates in previous studies (Tol 2009). Split over 16 regions 
(“sovereignty”) the social costs are obviously much lower. China stands out 
as very vulnerable. This is due to a range of factors, including its large size, 
aging population, precarious water supply, and economic concentration in 
the coastal zone. For regions with slow (fast) growth, the compensated 
social costs are higher (lower) than the cooperative costs. The equity-
weighted social costs are $28/tC, almost double the simple sum as more 
weight is placed on the higher impacts in the poorer regions. Good-
neighbour social costs are much higher than equity-weighted damages for 
rich regions, and lower for poor regions. Altruistic social costs are 
somewhere in between the sovereign costs and the good-neighbour costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Regional Marginal Damage Costs of Carbon Dioxide (in $/tC)  
 
 
USA=United States of America; CAN=Canada; WEU=Western Europe; 
JPK=Japan and South Korea; ANZ=Australia and New Zealand; 
EEU=Eastern Europe; FSU=Former Soviet Union; MDE=Middle 
East;CAM=Central America; SAM=South America; SAS=South Asia; 
SEA=Southeast Asia; CHI=China; NAF=North Africa; SSA=Sub-Saharan 
Africa; SIS=Small Island States; Source: (Anthoff and Tol 2010). 
 
The policy implications are twofold. First, a wide range of carbon taxes 
can be defended. The highest carbon tax differs from the lowest carbon tax 
by up to a factor of 70. This large difference is solely due to different 
ethical positions on the kind of responsibility one country should have 
towards other countries. That is a political decision. 
 
Second, without cooperation, different regions will have different 
carbon taxes. However, a lack of international cooperation on target-setting 
does not necessarily lead to low carbon taxes. If countries agree to 
compensate one another for the damage they do to one another, carbon 
taxes would be substantial. That obligation already exists in principle, but 
practice is different. A treaty making countries liable for the damage they 
cause would most likely reduce emissions further than an international 
treaty on emission reduction. 
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 While patterns of access to, and participation, in higher education are now 
well established in the Irish context, less is known about  progression once 
students have entered the third level sector.   For the first time, data gathered 
from all institutions funded by the Higher Education Authority allow us to 
examine the factors influencing student progression in Irish higher education 
institutions. Uniquely, these data track the full cohort of new entrants to 
higher education in 2007/08, to see if they progressed to second year in 
2008/09. Drawing on these data, a recent study† examined student 
progression from first to second year across higher education institutions, 
sectors and courses. The study found that an average of 15 per cent of new 
entrants were not present one year later. Further, the results showed large 
differences across institutions – for example, the percentage of honours 
degree  students not progressing ranged from 3 to 25 per cent across 
institutions.  
 
What are the key factors accounting for this variation in progression rates? 
Are progression rates linked mainly to differences between the institutions 
themselves, differences in the difficulty of particular courses, or to differences 
in the characteristics of students enrolling in these institutions? Investigation 
of these issues requires an analytical approach going beyond simple descriptive 
statistics. Research findings based on a multivariate approach highlight the 
types of students most likely to struggle to progress, and  illustrate the 
importance of taking account of the types of students enrolled in different 
courses and institutions in comparing progression rates. When results are 
adjusted to allow for such like-for-like comparisons of institutions, differences 
in student progression across the higher education sector are much smaller. 
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 It is clear that academic preparedness plays a central role in student success in 
higher education. Leaving Certificate performance emerges as a strong 
predictor of successful progression within higher education, in line with 
research in a wide range of countries. Attainment in mathematics is a 
particularly important predictor – suggesting that students with poor 
mathematical skills, in particular, struggle to meet the academic demands of 
higher education. While at an overall level males are less likely to progress in 
their course, this reflects their greater entry into courses and fields of study 
Student 
Progression  
which have higher dropout rates. Significant differences in progression are 
apparent across subject areas and fields of study - even when we take account 
of the types of students enrolled in different courses and institutions and their 
prior attainment. The results show higher levels of non-progression among 
students taking courses in computer science and greater levels of progression 
among students taking courses in the healthcare and education fields. 
Furthermore, the results show that students in receipt of a state maintenance 
grant display greater progression rates than those not in receipt of such 
support. This may be due to greater financial security for students in receipt of 
a grant, their reduced reliance on part-time work or simply students ensuring 
that they fulfil the requirements of their courses to retain grant eligibility  
(since students who fail their exams and are required to repeat the year lose 
their eligibility for a grant for that year).  
 
 The analysis highlights the importance of taking account of differences in 
the composition of student intakes in assessing the effectiveness of 
institutions in student retention. In examining institutional variation across the 
higher education sector, it is clear that wide overall differences across 
institutions to a large extent reflect differences in the types of students 
enrolling in different colleges. This provides some support for an argument 
that colleges cannot be held solely accountable for retention and graduation 
rates. Clearly, colleges vary widely in the ‘quality’ of students they enrol and 
hence taking account of student composition is of utmost importance in 
assessing variation in student progression. Taking such an approach, the 
picture that emerges is substantially different to that portrayed by unadjusted 
descriptive results.  When results are adjusted to allow for like-for-like 
comparisons, differences across the whole higher education sector are 
substantially smaller. The main differences in progression rates emerge 
between the University, Institute of Technology and Other Colleges 
(predominantly Colleges of Education) sectors. Importantly, the research 
highlights that a simplistic focus on raw or absolute levels of 
progression/completion across institutions carries the danger of rewarding 
institutions with more selective student intakes. 
Institutional 
Variation 
 
 
† O. MOONEY, V. PATTERSON, M. O’CONNOR and A. CHANTLER, 
2010. A Study of Progression in Irish Higher Education, Dublin: Higher 
Education Authority. 
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 CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN 
PARENTING PRACTICES 
∗Aisling Murray 
Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
 
 
 
There is an increasing acceptance across the disciplines of psychology, 
sociology and health that an individual’s development does not take place 
in a social vacuum (see for example Bronfenbrenner’s bio-ecological 
model, e.g. Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 2006). The development of infants, 
in particular, is influenced by their parents: relying on them for food, 
shelter, protection, health care and fostering development. Hence we might 
expect that those individuals and organisations which influence parents 
(grandparents, friends, the media) will also have an indirect, but important, 
influence on infants. 
 
Variation across countries provide some useful evidence as to 
differences in the social and cultural contexts in which children are brought 
up. For example, one study noted that young children (aged 4-6 years) in 
the USA performed better on a task involving catching moving objects but 
their counterparts in Hong Kong did better on tasks requiring manual 
dexterity and balance. It was suggested by the authors that the differences 
in the manual dexterity could be related to early learning of writing and 
chopstick use (Chow, Henderson & Barnett, 2001). But cultural differences 
may also be observed among children born and living in the same country 
to parents whose country of origin differs. When comparing children 
within the same country influences such as climate, access to food, media 
and health or education policy might be expected to show less variation, 
allowing the role of differences in cultural child-rearing practices to be seen 
more clearly. The recent report** on 9-month-olds in the Growing Up in 
Ireland study finds some interesting differences in parenting practices 
according to mother’s country of birth for infants living in the same 
country.  Growing Up in Ireland is a nationally representative study that 
included 11,100 families with infants aged 9-months.  Even with a fairly 
rudimentary distinction of mother being born within or outside Ireland 
(73% and 27% respectively), several notable differences in parenting 
practices emerged as outlined in the following paragraphs. 
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 FEEDING 
Mothers born outside Ireland were much more likely to breastfeed than 
Irish mothers.  This pattern applied when considering ever breastfeeding 
(83% to 48%), exclusive breastfeeding (64% to 38%) and duration of 
breastfeeding (14 weeks to 11 weeks).  As might be expected from these 
figures, Irish-born mothers introduced formula milk earlier (28-days-old) 
than mothers born in other countries (59-days-old).  In terms of other 
drinks, Irish-born mothers were more likely to have given their infants 
cows’ milk (43% compared with 35%) but less likely to have given infants 
tea to drink (5% compared with 15%). 
Figure 1: Comparison of Parenting Practices According to Mother’s 
Country of Birth 
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SLEEPING 
Mothers born in Ireland were more likely to be following 
recommendations in regard to sleeping position for infants, which is 
placing them on their back to sleep in order to reduce the risk of Sudden 
Infant Death Syndrome (cot death).  More than four-out-of-five Irish-born 
mothers (81%) usually placed their infants to sleep on their back compared 
to just 61% of mothers born elsewhere.  Co-sleeping or bed-sharing, where 
the infant’s usual place of sleep is in the parental bed rather than their own 
cot, was more common among mothers born outside Ireland (21% 
compared with 8%).  Whether co-sleeping is beneficial or otherwise for 
infant development is still much debated in the literature with some arguing 
that it facilitates breastfeeding (McKenna, Mosko & Richard, 1997) while 
others point to the increased risk of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome for 
some co-sleeping infants such as those whose mothers smoke  (Fleming, 
Blair, Bacon et al, 1996).   
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Future Directions 
The Growing Up in Ireland dataset will allow further examination of 
cultural differences in parenting practices through disaggregation of 
country of origin; for example greater differences might be expected 
between Western and non-Western cultures than between the UK and 
Ireland.  The data will also allow consideration of the length of time a 
mother has lived in Ireland and how this might affect variations in 
parenting practices.  In terms of Government policy, it does not appear 
that one group (based on this simple classification) is more likely to follow 
recommendations than the other: non-Irish-born mothers were more likely 
to breastfeed but less likely to adapt the recommended sleeping position.  
What is clear, however, is that cultural differences in parenting practices 
and the reasons underlying those differences need to be considered both in 
the development of new child-related policies as well as the implementation 
of existing policies. 
 
 
**WILLIAMS, J., S. GREENE, S. MCNALLY, A. MURRAY and A. 
QUAIL (2010). Growing Up in Ireland – The National Longitudinal 
Study of Children: The Infants and their Families. Dublin: The 
Stationery Office 
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 PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
UTILISATION OF IN-PATIENT 
BEDS IN IRISH ACUTE PUBLIC 
HOSPITALS 
∗ Jacqueline O’Reilly and Miriam Wiley 
Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland 
 
 Health care systems in many developed countries have services financed 
and provided by both public and private sectors. In Ireland, though, the 
public/private mix is atypical: a private patient can be treated in an acute 
public hospital and seen by a consultant who may also treat public patients 
within the same hospital. Nationally, one in five beds in acute public 
hospitals is designated for use by private patients and existing legislation 
restricts accommodation of a private patient in a public-designated bed. Yet 
there are concerns that acute public hospitals may sidestep such restrictions 
on their private practice, resulting in public hospital resources potentially 
being diverted away from public patients towards their private 
counterparts. Indeed, Irish providers face financial incentives which favour 
the treatment of private patients. Consultants are rewarded on a fee-for-
service basis for private care, but receive a salary for public practice. Public 
hospitals, meanwhile, receive a fixed daily payment for every private patient 
in a private bed. Added to these financial incentives is an increased 
opportunity to engage in private practice due to the substantial recent 
growth in private health insurance subscribers.  
 
Our paper† uses data on the public/private status of discharges to 
examine the utilisation of designated private and public in-patient beds in 
Irish acute public hospitals over the period 2000-2004. In each year, 
estimated actual utilisation of beds by private and public in-patients at 
hospital level was compared with the bed capacity potentially available for 
each group. The annual number of bed days used, obtained from the 
Hospital In-Patient Enquiry scheme, measured actual utilisation. Potential 
utilisation was estimated using data on the number and designation of in-
patient beds obtained from the Department of Health and Children.   
 
The results of our analysis indicated that private in-patients used more 
bed days than were theoretically available to them in 14.1 per cent of 
hospital-year observations. The equivalent figure for public in-patients was 
12.6 per cent. Although the prevalence of excess utilisation of private in-
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patient beds was relatively small and nearly balanced out across the public 
hospital system as a whole, it did increase over the study period.  
 
It would appear, therefore, that some acute public hospitals have 
apparently been able to overcome restrictions imposed on them in relation 
to the volume of private practice. Our results are consistent with at least 
two competing hypotheses. Firstly, excess private utilisation may be 
compatible with the efficient use of scarce resources by hospitals where 
demand from public patients is low (and vice-versa where there is excess 
utilisation by public patients). Alternatively, given fixed capacity constraints 
in the short run, excess private utilisation could imply a re-distribution of 
resources from public to private in-patients and could be consistent with 
allegations of public patients being displaced by their private counterparts. 
Further research is required to determine which hypothesis is correct given 
this Irish experience, and thus ascertain the appropriate policy response. 
From an international perspective, our findings illustrate how differential 
payment mechanisms in a mixed public/private system may influence 
provider behaviour, potentially resulting in the preferential treatment of 
one patient group to the detriment of another.  
 
 
 
 
† O’REILLY, J. and M. WILEY, 2010. Who’s that sleeping in my bed? 
Potential and actual utilization of public and private in-patient beds in Irish 
acute public hospitals. Journal of Health Services Research & Policy, Vol. 15, No. 
4, pp. 210-214.  
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